

12/12 - BNA - The Soviet Ambassador in Kabul, Boris Pastoukhov, commenting on the Bush-Gorbachev mini-summit, said that the Soviet side had stressed the necessity for an "intra-Afghan dialogue, holding a nation-wide conference, the convocation of an int'l conference on Afghanistan - that is - on the ideas favored by Pres. Najibullah." He added that "the American side once again spoke in favor of the so-called transitional period in the process of settlement, which provokes no substantial objections from our side."

- The population of Mazar-i-Sharif is estimated to be over 300,000.

12/13 - BNA - Bakhtar reported that Iran was planning to round up all Afghan refugees in that country & put them in special camps. The ROA objected on the grounds that such an action ran "counter to human dignity." Iran now says the plan was unrealistic & this has made "the Afghan refugees & the people of Afghanistan happy."

- Over 65.4% of the PDPA members are in the ROA armed forces.

12/14 - BNA - Fighting is reported in Nangarhar, Paktia, Kandahar & Laghman provinces.

- Peter Tomsen reportedly advised Rabbani to replace the present interim gov't with a more broad-based one within the next 3 months.
- The 25th anniversary of the founding of the PDPA will be celebrated on 1/1/90.
- Article I of the law on narcotics of the ROA "prohibits the cultivation, production, purchase, sale, smuggle, storage, spread & use of narcotics resolutely." Anti-narcotics units are active all over the country. Last year the anti-drug dept. registered 110,000 addicts in the ROA, most of whom used hashish or opium. 1,350 addicts were hospitalized for treatment & most have recovered.

12/15 - NYT - From Islamabad, John Burns reports that the Bhutto Gov't is getting impatient with the burden of supporting the Afghan guerrillas,

and that some Pakistani officials say that the US position may be solidifying a stalemate by allowing guerrilla leaders to exercise a veto over any negotiations with Kabul.

Although various alternative policies have been circulating among Pakistani officials, all of them have in common a move that the United States has so far been reluctant to make: telling the rebels, in effect, that they can no longer rely on the \$600 million a year in arms and other assistance that has been provided by Washington if they cannot force Mr. Najibullah from power and if they refuse to consider any talks, however indirect, with Kabul. . . .

The Pakistanis said senior American officials who have visited here recently, including Peter Tomsen, President Bush's special envoy to the Afghan resistance, admitted that the hopes American officials have expressed in public - that the rebels will unite behind the provisional government established in Pakistan this year, and that they will achieve a military breakthrough that will force Mr. Najibullah out - seem increasingly unrealistic.

Still, the Pakistani officials said, the Americans argued for sticking with the policy, partly because they do not believe that anything else is likely to work and partly because they hope that Mikhail S. Gorbachev, the Soviet leader, will dump Mr. Najibullah.

At one point, the officials said, Mr. Bhutto said she would consider opening the Afghan policy for national debate by making a speech in the National Assembly that would question where the current approach was leading. But the officials said the Prime Minister decided not to speak, partly because of her concerns about trouble from Pakistan's most powerful fundamentalist group, the Islamic Society, which has close ties to the strongest and most hard-line of the Afghan rebel factions.

Now, the officials said, if a policy change was to come, it would have to be initiated by the United States.

12/17 - NYT - An estimated 1.3m Afghan civilians have died since the April 1978 revolution; as many as 1,000 have been killed in Kabul since January 1989.

- The UN is expected to appeal for 2,000 tons of hi-protein food supplements to stave off malnutrition afflicting thousands of children in Afghanistan. A UNICEF survey taken in October showed that up to 40% of Kabul's children suffer "mild to moderate" malnutrition. Food prices in Kabul have doubled since October.

12/20 - LAT - Pacha Gul Wafatar, a former ROA Min. of Aviation, defected to the resistance in Peshawar. He said he had worked secretly in Kabul for the guerrillas for almost 10 years & had recently been advised by one of the resistance factions to flee Kabul because of a possible coup attempt.

12/25 - LAT - The Soviet Congress of People's Deputies voted 1,678 to 18, with 19 abstentions, to condemn the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

The decision to invade "was made by a narrow circle of people in violation of the Soviet constitution, according to which such matters belong to the jurisdiction of higher state bodies," Alexander Dzasokhov, chairman of the committee on international affairs, told Congress in proposing the resolution.

Dzasokhov noted that the Soviet leaders had acted in an atmosphere of "excessively ideological and sharp political confrontation that characterized the international situation at the time."

Nevertheless, he said, that "cannot justify the decision to dispatch troops."

Dzasokhov stressed that Soviet veterans should not be condemned. "This political assessment does not cast a shadow on Soviet soldiers and officers who honestly did their duty," he said.

The government released new fatality figures, saying 14,143 soldiers were killed in the conflict. The previous official death toll was 13,310.

Bhutto in plea for rebels to negotiate

LONDON: Pakistan's Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto has urged Afghan rebels, who depend heavily on her country's support, to unite and negotiate with the Soviet-backed Government of President Najibullah.

"They must take not just military measures, but political measures," Ms Bhutto said in a television interview for the BBC *Panorama* program last night.

She said the parties in the Mujahadeen rebel government-in-exile should listen to their friends — "not just Pakistan, but others too" — who have called on them to broaden the base of their government and speak with one voice.

"If they want success, they'll do it, and if they don't do it one can draw one's own conclusion."

"Our major difficulty is that none of the Afghan parties involved in the Afghan interim government are prepared to negotiate with the hard-liners in the Kabul regime."

Several Mujahadeen leaders told an interviewer they were prepared to fight on to achieve an Islamic Afghanistan and called for unconditional support from Pakistan and the United States.

But guerrilla leader Haji Abdul Latif, giving his last interview before his death in August, said rebel rocket fire against Kabul was killing innocent people.

"And all for the sake of killing a few communists. My Mujahadeen won't stand for it."

Mr Latif, known as "The Lion of Kandahar", may have been poisoned by rival Mujahadeen, according to rebel sources.

General Najibullah told the BBC that he rejected any suggestion the Soviet Union might pressure him to stand down.

"The status of the party and the individuals in it are determined by the will of the people, and not by the instructions and policies of the superpowers," he said.

Bhutto backs Afghan rebels



Associated Press

Benazir Bhutto

ISLAMABAD: Pakistan's Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto yesterday pledged continuing support for an Afghan rebel Government-in-exile and denied she had urged it to negotiate with the Kabul Government.

Speaking after a three-day visit to Bangladesh, she also said Pakistan and the Soviet Union were near agreement on a compromise United Nations resolution on Afghanistan.

Ms Bhutto was asked about radio reports quoting her as saying in an interview the Afghan Interim Government (AIG) based in the Pakistani capital should nego-

tiate with Soviet-backed President Najibullah.

"I didn't give any such interview," she said.

"I have said that they (the AIG) should talk to Najib?" she asked. "I should like to hear that voice again, it could not be my voice."

The radio reports were apparently referring to a British television interview in which she said: "Our major difficulty is that none of the Afghan parties involved in the Afghan interim Government are prepared to negotiate with the hard-liners in the Kabul regime."

Ms Bhutto yesterday said that since her Government came to power last December attempts had been made to convince the Mujahadeen rebels that it was about to drop Pakistan's traditional support for them.

"This is totally incorrect, we are very consistent in our policy," she said. "We consider the AIG as the best possible framework for seeking a political settlement."

She said the interim Government was flexible enough to absorb other Afghan groups into its ranks, including Iran-based Mujahadeen, local guerrilla commanders inside Afghanistan and those she termed "good Muslims".

The AIG has refused to consider negotiating with General Najibullah's Government, saying it is a Soviet puppet responsible for the deaths of more than one million people in the 11-year-old Afghan civil war.

But it says it would be

US, Soviets urged to stop arming Afghans

WASHINGTON: The United States should explore the possibility of a mutual agreement with the Soviet Union to cut off military supplies to Afghanistan, a leading senator said in a report published yesterday.

Claiborne Pell, chairman of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, also called for a neutral government in Kabul to conduct elections or seek a traditional Afghan consultative assembly.

Mr Pell issued the report after a trip to Pakistan in August and talks with Pakistani leaders and leaders of the US and Pakistan-backed provisional government established by Moslem guerrilla parties last February.

"So far the United States has placed too much emphasis on achieving an elusive military victory and too little on finding a political formula that will end the fighting and produce a government in Kabul acceptable to the Afghan people," Mr Pell said.

He said the United States should work with

Pakistan towards a political solution to the Afghan conflict, which he said was likely to remain stalemated through 1990.

Since Soviet troops withdrew from Afghanistan last February after supporting the Kabul government for 10 years, Kabul has defied predictions, particularly in the West, that it would quickly fall to the Mujahadeen based in north-western Pakistan.

Mr Pell said the most promising route to a political settlement would be establishment of a neutral government to conduct national elections or call a truly representative "loya jirga," or traditional Afghan consultative assembly.

"The former King, Zahir Shah, is one truly national Afghan figure who might be acceptable to both large segments of the Mujahadeen and the Soviet Union," he said.

Pakistan rejects the return of the former king, though it has said the Afghan rebels should seek his support to strengthen their position.

— Reuter

HKS - 10/2

prepared to co-operate with "good Muslims" in General Najibullah's Government who are not tainted by what it calls "war crimes".

Hong Kong Standard - 10/4

Najibullah holding his own say Soviets

KABUL: Soviet diplomats here say the Najibullah government has proved it can hold its own against the US-backed Mujahadeen, and accuse Washington of being Afghanistan's real "troublemaker".

Rebel rockets continue to land on Kabul and there is fierce fighting in several border regions. But a Soviet diplomat said: "Never in Afghanistan (does) the central government control the whole territory."

Opponents of President Najibullah say his government follows a "divide and rule" policy much

like the Soviets did in their decade of military occupation which ended in mid-February.

Mr Najibullah's official policy, they say, is to reach separate, private accords with guerrilla commanders from different ethnic groups in exchange for their support or neutrality.

"Why not? It's a common practice," said one Soviet specialist.

With a nucleus of some 25,000 regulars in the Afghan army, Mr Najibullah's government had shown that it "stands on its own feet" against repeated attacks, said a

diplomat. It was the only group capable of "consolidating" the country.

Soviet diplomats deny US charges that more than 300 military advisers remain in Afghanistan, acknowledging privately that are not more than about two dozen.

None of the Mujahadeen guerrilla factions based in Pakistan or Iran is prepared to negotiate with Mr Najibullah or members of his party, seen as Soviet puppets.

The Soviet diplomats conceded that future negotiations could lead to a change of power in Kabul. But the

2,000-kilometre Afghan-Soviet border meant that "any government will have to have good relations with us," said one.

He said he was worried about "hawks" in the US administration who wanted to stir up trouble in Soviet regions near the predominantly Moslem republics of central Asia.

"For 10 years they (the US) tried to unite the Mujahadeen," he said, but to end the guerrillas' longstanding feuds was "not so easy".

"It requires time," he said, adding that the US wanted to prove that its aid was not in vain. — AFP

Soviet political experts

ALEXANDER BOVIN, IZVESTIA POLITICAL NEWS ANALYST: At last, the Soviet Foreign Minister, in his official speech, said the truth about our "Afghan" action. The decision to bring Soviet troops into Afghanistan was the grossest and biggest mistake in our foreign policy in the past decade. In fact, he said, we confronted ourselves to the world community, violated the internationally recognised norms of behaviour and acted contrary to human interests. It was necessary to make a full use of non-military methods and political solutions.

That action also contradicted our own laws and civil ethics, which resulted in a negative attitude in our country to the Afghan war. Some people, referring to economic difficulties in the Soviet Union, demand stopping aid to the Afghan government. What will be the worth of our faithfulness if we start giving up our obligations depending on circumstances, how will we be able to preserve the reputation of a reliable international partner? Apart from that, without our support, it will be much more difficult for the present Kabul regime to defend itself. We are helping Kabul and will continue doing so to stabilise the situation in the country within the framework of national reconciliation.

During my last visit to Afghanistan in December, 1988, on the eve of the completion of the Soviet troop withdrawal, I collected a rather pessimistic impression. I thought that after 'we' left Afghanistan, the governmental forces would not be able to withstand the enemy's attacks for long. I was wrong. For eight months now, Kabul has been successfully fighting against the irreconcilable opposition which has failed to win a single battle. Yet, the situation in the country remains difficult.

PROF. ALEXEI KIVA, DEPARTMENT HEAD AT THE INSTITUTE OF ORIENTAL STUDIES OF THE USSR ACADEMY OF SCIENCES: The new political thinking has prompted us to guide ourselves by human values not only in home but also in foreign policy. Fundamental international documents, the UN Charter above all, are the basis for forming a code of behaviour of all countries. The recognition of this fact helped us to find the moral support in analysing our actions in the international arena and to assess in principle the bringing of Soviet troops into

Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze delivered a report at the USSR Supreme Soviet session on October 23. A considerable part of his speech dealt with Afghanistan. In this connection, the APN offers views of well-known Soviet political scientists and experts on Afghanistan.

Afghanistan. Nonetheless, analysing the current Afghan events, one cannot help seeing that the revolutionary process in Afghanistan is irreversible, no matter how dramatic it may be. Millions of the Afghans involved in it pay with their blood for the last years' mistakes and the opportunity to realise that they are part of the world community of democratic states.

But it could have been achieved with smaller sacrifices: through mutual compromises for which president Najibullah calls especial responsibility in this case rests with the USSR and the USA, whose involvement in the conflict is obvious. The Soviet Union, as you know, has put forth a package of proposals to solve the Afghan problem in a political way. The key proposal is that both states should stop delivering arms to conflicting sides. The USA has rejected the call so far, though it is clear that the pre-revolutionary past cannot be restored in Afghanistan.

MAJ.-GEN. VIKTOR KUTSENKO: I had a dual feeling listening to Eduard Shevardnadze when he spoke about the Afghan events at the USSR Supreme Soviet. He was right saying that by bringing troops into Afghanistan we confronted ourselves to the world community and violated the norms of behaviour of a civilised state. But history cannot be turned back, and the bringing of troops is not the whole history.


A serious conversation about Afghanistan is impossible without analysing the situation and answering the question: whom did Soviet soldiers and officers try to help? I spent three years in Afghanistan, working as

a military adviser. This is long enough to be able to understand that country and its peculiarities. I am convinced that we supported progressive people in Afghanistan. I trusted those Afghans with whom we faced death more than once. They have been fighting for the civilised development of Afghanistan. There were mistakes, even serious ones. We sometimes ran ahead, so to speak. That is true. But everybody who was in Afghanistan will admit: the

backwardness of the country, the poverty of its people produce an oppressive impression. This has prompted the progressive part of Afghan society to start changing the medieval way of life in their country.

Despite all difficulties, Kabul is successfully withstanding the rebels and strengthening its positions every day. President Najibullah and his supporters are our friends who believe Russians, supporting new political processes in Afghanistan and thinking about our economic difficulties, we must not forget our friends. There is part of us, of our souls, in them, rather in many of us.

PT -11/9



Hikmetyar's term for joining AIG

By Our Special Correspondent

ISLAMABAD—Engineer Gulbadin Hikmetyar, chief of a faction of Hizb-i-Islami, has expressed his readiness to join the Afghan Interim Government for the sake of unity or to hold talks with other Afghan parties about the formation of a new government.

The leader of the Afghan party, which has boycotted the AIG, made these seemingly conciliatory gestures in reply to questions at a Press conference here on Saturday. In his statement given earlier, he, however, said his group could rejoin other six parties if they agree to elections.

The AIG, he explained, was formed earlier this year on the basis of the specific agreement that it would hold elections within six months but if it did not do so, it would stand dissolved after that period. He waved photocopy of a document and said on this basis, the AIG already stood dissolved, the Hizb leader declared.

Likewise, he asserted, the Islamic Unity of Afghan Alliance too stood dissolved after having formed AIG, he asserted.

As AIG failed to hold elections as stipulated or to obtain vote of confidence, "We suspended our membership of AIG". Nevertheless, Hizb was ready to return to its fold if they agreed to hold elections.

Engineer Hikmetyar was rather edgy and in reply to a question regarding the reported release of Soviet prisoners by an Afghan party in return for money, he accused the journalists of selling

everything for money.

Dismissing the apprehension that the polls, as proposed by him, might trigger internal strife among Afghans, the Hizb leader said these could be held among 5½ million Afghan refugees living in foreign countries. Those who are committed to the democratic norms, would never try to stage coup d'etat, he agreed.

Engineer Hikmetyar, referring to the military situation in Afghanistan, described it as in favour of Mujahideen. They were controlling the Salang Highway and had kept up pressure in Logar, Nangarhar, Khost, Kandahar and Ghazni provinces which was causing total distress to the Kabul regime, he asserted.

In keeping with his recent utterances against United States, he said the solution of Afghan problem lies, among other things, in both the superpowers ceasing their interference in Afghan affairs. In this connection, Engineer Hikmetyar demanded that both Soviet Union and United States should stop the supply of arms and leave the Afghans to carve out their destiny.

He said he would guarantee that the "other side" does not supply arms, should Soviet Union stop the same for the Afghan government. He gave the further "guarantee" that in that case, Afghanistan would not be turned into a military base for any other power to be used as springboard for interference in Soviet Union.

He was visibly non-plussed when

he was reminded that the concept of "negative implicit in symmetry" his call for cessation of arms supplies had been rejected by him when USSR itself had proposed it.

The Hizb-i-Islami leader parried questions about how he would prevent the US supply of arms to other Afghan Mujahideen parties and whether he would refuse to accept continued arms supplies by Saudi Arabia.

He replied in the affirmative when asked if he was short of arms. He was reminded of his recent statement in which he had complained against United States for having reduced arms supplies and asked whether his present ire was related to that circumstance.

Since when he had received no arms from US he was asked. After some hesitation, he told the incredulous journalists, mainly western, that he had never received any arms from United States. "Ask ISI" he evasively replied when a newsman asked him whether he had received US supplied arms through ISI.

Recounting various options for solution of Afghan problem, Engineer Hikmetyar also hypothesised a military solution by the Afghan Army Officers overthrowing the PDPA government and then ruling Afghanistan through a revolutionary council in collaboration with commanders around Kabul. This council would rule the country for six months and then hold elections for inducting a representative government.

THE
PAKISTAN TIMES

Frontier Post 10/4

Mujahideen factions' secret talks with Kabul

WITH the Mujahideen Interim Government on the verge of disintegration, at least two and possibly more groups have held secret talks with the Kabul Regime.

Western diplomats and senior Pakistani officials said that Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, leader of the Hizb-e-Islami, met senior army officers

From Ahmed Rashid

belonging to the Khalq faction of the Afghan Regime outside Kabul last month. Sources said they discussed the possibility of a Khalq-led army coup against President Najibullah, which would be backed by Hikmatyar. Western diplomats said that last month's temporary disappearance of the Afghan Defence Minister and leading Khalqi, Lt-General Shah Nawaz Tanai and Government's surveillance of 8-10 Afghan generals, was a move by President Najibullah to preempt such a coup. Although General Tanai has subsequently reappeared in public, Kabul is reported extremely tense.

Khalqi officers, who dominate the army and remain bitterly opposed to President Najibullah's Parcham faction are also predominantly Ghilzai Pathans from eastern Afghanistan and advocates of Pathan nationalism. Mr Hikmatyar and many of his commanders are also Ghilzais. At present Mr Hikmatyar is considerably isolated from the other six Mujahideen parties, because of the alleged massacre by his party of 30 rivals from the other group.

Diplomatic sources said that the US has suspended arms shipments to him and although Foreign Minister of the interim government, he has been denied entry into the United States. Although he is still being funded by Saudi Arabia, a Khalqi coup in Kabul would be for him, his only logical way to power at present. Last week in Peshawar he publicly expressed his support for such a Khalqi coup, urging Afghan Army officers to act. However, Afghan sources said that when he put this to the other six Mujahideen parties in the interim government last month, his proposal was turned down.

Diplomatic sources also said that a relative of Pir Ahmed Gailani, leader of the moderate National Islamic Front of Afghanistan (NIFA), secretly met President Najibullah in Kabul three months ago, to explore the possibility of forming a government with ex-King Zahir Shah. NIFA sources confirmed this. NIFA and many senior Parchamis

including Najibullah are associated with the Durrani Pathans, who historically ruled Afghanistan before the Communist coup of 1978, and are bitter rivals of the Ghilzais. Ghilzai Pathans in both Khalq and the resistance have the idea of being ruled by Durrani again. However, Zahir Shah has refused to return to Kabul as long as Najibullah remains President.

With a military victory now virtually ruled out and the interim government bitterly divided, elements in the resistance are now attempting to get together with their tribal and ethnic allies in the Kabul Regime. The ideological differences between Islam and Communism have taken a back seat in the intense and secret political manoeuvring going on between Kabul and Peshawar. All this would appear to leave out the important Afghan minorities such as the Tajiks: and the Hazaras, who lack status or numbers in the power elite, but command military pre-eminence.

However, there has been intense but unconfirmed speculation that the Tajik commander, Ahmad Shah Masud has also cut a secret deal with Kabul to allow food and arms convoys from the Soviet Union to reach Kabul through the strategic Salang Pass, in exchange for one-fifth of the goods he allows through. Afghan sources said that Masud has categorically rejected the interim government as being unrepresentative, although he will not give up the war against the Kabul Regime. Highly placed sources said that efforts by US and Pakistani intelligence to persuade Masud to launch an offensive against Kabul have failed.

Masud is not prepared to do so until a more acceptable interim government is formed. He also faces the presence of large numbers of Hizb-e-Islami Mujahideen between his base in the Panjshir and Kabul. Any move by Masud's forces would lead to intense retaliation by Hizb-e-Islami.

Likewise, the Hazaras who are Shia Muslims and are backed by Iran, have already rejected the interim government and have moved much closer to the Moscow-Kabul position for a peace settlement. The minorities are nervous about any future government dominated once again by Pathans, who form 60 per cent of the Afghan population.

This highly complex and bizarre mess in the present Afghan war leaves the Washington-Islamabad line of a Mujahideen military victory even more difficult to

achieve.

The dilemma for US-Pakistan policy is that component parties of the interim government are themselves calling for its dissolution. Mr Hikmatyar has called for dissolving the interim government and for elections amongst the five million Afghan refugees and Afghans living in liberated areas, to choose a new government. He said the interim government has lost the confidence of the Afghans. The moderate Mujahideen parties, particularly NIFA have taken no interest in the interim government and are still intent on calling for a *Loya Jirga* that would ease the way for ex-King Zahir Shah to return to Afghanistan. No prominent Mujahideen field commander has yet endorsed the interim government.

The war on the ground is increasingly becoming what one diplomat called "a money war", with little fighting but intense missile attacks from both sides. The Kabul Regime has fired off some 400 Scud missiles, at a cost of one million dollars each on Mujahideen positions while the resistance have fired some 280 rockets on Kabul in the past six weeks, killing

160 people and injuring 500. Reports from Kabul suggest that these missile attacks have considerably antagonised the population of Kabul, but with the unwillingness of Mujahideen commanders to launch attacks on cities, the missile offensive remains the only way the Mujahideen can maintain pressure on the Kabul Regime.

Publicly the Mujahideen reject any negotiations with Kabul, privately they are all secretly talking to Kabul. This could lead to sheer anarchy, as Mujahideen groups cut separate deals with factions in Kabul but are unable to form a government which commands broad enough support. "There is a crisis of legitimacy in Afghanistan and Zahir Shah is the only national figure who could possibly cut across the divide," said a Pakistani source.

However, the former King is only prepared to act if there is an internationally backed peace process and there is still no sign of that.

These two items came from the 12/22 issue of the AFGHAN NEWS, a NY paper. Where it got them, we have no idea.

What lies ahead in Afghanistan

In the rebel camp, the Pushtuns today are represented by six armed parties. Hikmatyar's Hizb-e-Islami basically represents the Ghilzai Pushtuns. Its fundamentalist Islamic views have managed to attract certain lower middle class sections of urban Pushtuns, one should add. Being a Ghilzai Pushtun, Hikmatyar is unwilling to accept the leadership of the former King, scion of the house of Mohammadzai Pushtuns. Maulvi Mohammad Yunus Khalis is a representative of tribal Pushtuns from the north, while Maulvi Mohammad Nabi also claims tribal Pushtuns among his followers. In the Nauman and Nangarhar provinces, it is Yunus who is influential, while the Ahmadzai tribes of Pakia province side with Mohammadi. It should be mentioned in passing that Najibullah belongs to Pakia's Ahmadzai Pushtuns. The Ittehad-Islami of Abdul Rasul Sayyaf is actually made up of fragmented Pushtun parties. Sibghatullah Mujaddadi and Mohammad Gilani represent Afghanistan's ruling Pushtun tribes and families. They have the support of the more prosperous Pushtuns and their privileged sections, including former Pushtun army officers.

Mujaddadi and Gilani are not only big landlords and *pirs* — religious leaders with a cult following — but also self-professed non-Pushtuns since they claim to have originated from Arabia. All Pushtun parties have two things in common. First, they are fractionally divided and Pushtuns shall rule Afghanistan, and, two, because of their deep regional, tribal and class differences, they are not agreed as to which Pushtun party or leader among them should rule the country. As a result of the April Revolution, the Mohammadzai family which had always held the

reins of leadership, lost this privilege. Ten years later, Pushtun tribes and groups are devoid of any kind of central leadership. If one group proposes the name of the former King, a Mohammadzai, the other pulls out their guns. This lack of an agreed national leadership can lead to an extremely dangerous situation in the event of a rebel victory.

The other major Afghan nationality are the Tajiks. One direct benefit they have derived from the war is that they have managed to arm themselves to the teeth. Today, compared to other nationalities and tribes, they are better organised militarily and politically. If Burhanuddin Rabbani is their agreed political leader, Ahmed Shah Masud is their undisputed military hero. The Persian-speaking Uzbeks, Turkmen and Heratis and other Sunni groups are also on their side. There is a strong possibility that in the future the Tajiks would demand a reappointment of political power with the Pushtuns. A bitter struggle between the disorganised and leaderless Pushtuns and organised Tajiks must not be ruled out.

The Shi'a's of Afghanistan, most of whom belong to the Hazarajat and Herat regions, are divided into four armed parties. Two of these parties would like Hazarajat and Herat regions to be amalgamated with Islamic Shi'a Iran, while two would like to see them become autonomous. Like the Pushtuns, the Shi'a's too have failed to throw up an agreed central leadership. However, as a result of the war, they are fully armed and do not seem prepared to accept Pushtun hegemony as in the past. This is a dangerous situation.

In effect, the Sunni parties consisting of Pushtuns and Tajiks, and the Shi'a groups, comprising

Hazaras, Heratis and Imaqs, are today agreed on nothing at all. The Afghan society is, therefore, bitterly divided along political (PDPA and rebels), religious (Sunnis and Shi'as), nationalistic (Pushtuns, Tajiks and Hazaras), linguistic (Persian and other languages) and tribal lines. What is more, all of them are fully armed. It proves that the civil conflict which the April Revolution gave birth to will outlive the Revolution in various shapes and forms. If,

despite its subjective wish to push the wheel of history forward, the PDPA has been unable to do so, the rebels too will fail to turn back the clock and recreate the pre-Revolution situation in the country. It can be argued with equal validity that the political, social and psychological agitation created in the moribund Afghan society by the April Revolution will survive it. After all, it is not history's final verdict that 13 million Afghans should remain without land ownership rights, that women should live as helpless slaves or that weaker nationalities and classes should forever be persecuted. A rebel victory will not bring peace and the contradictions of Afghan society, unless resolved, will continue to cause violent upheavals. If the rebels, like the PDPA, repeat the mistake of establishing a 'strong centre' after taking power, they can be sure that in every province, area and tribe, the flag of armed rebellion will be raised.

The fact is that even before the April Revolution, the structure of state in Afghanistan existed but in name only. The country was not run along institutional but traditional tribal lines. While the PDPA was able to occupy the former royal palace in Kabul with the help of tanks in a matter of hours, all it inherited was power, not the state structure. In order to fulfil its particular objectives, the Party decided to implement reforms on gun-point, doing nothing to create state institutions. The situation has not changed. If the rebels take over, all they will take over will be the same

royal palace. In the absence of any constitution, legal structure or statewide institution, and given bitter and widespread blood vendettas, the armed nationalities, gangs and parties of Afghanistan will either speak to each other in the language of weapons or use the weapon of language to deal with each other.

After the April Revolution and following Soviet intervention, Pakistan and Iran willingly played host to opponents of the new order in Afghanistan. However, if the rebels come to power, there is every possibility that relations between Kabul and its two neighbouring

countries could go bad. Although all Pushtun armed resistance, all Pushtun parties and all Pushtun leaders, not to mention the majority of the community which sought shelter, are Pakistan-based, not one of the them has to date made a single statement about accepting the Durand Line as the agreed Pak-Afghan international boundary. Although this border dispute between the two countries is in a dormant state at present, it will be

erroneous to believe that it is not very much alive. On the other hand, the Afghan Shi'as consisting of Hazaras, Heratis and Imaqs, want either complete autonomy or accession to Iran. If the successors of Khomeini also decided to follow his policies towards Afghan Shi'as, not only could it lead to a civil war in Afghanistan but even result in outbreak of hostilities between Iran and its neighbour. There are at least two instances in contemporary history

where this has happened. After India helped the Bengalis of East Pakistan win freedom, the new state fell out with its benefactor on the question of the Farrakha Dam. China and Vietnam, which were such close allies during the war against the Americans, became bitter enemies because of Kampuchea. It is sobering to think that the help rendered to Bangladesh by India and to Vietnam by China was far more extensive than what Iran and Pakistan have done for Afghanistan.

Another aspect of the present war in Afghanistan which few people seem to have taken note of is that it has led to the further weakening of an already frail Afghan nationalism.

On the face of it, Soviet intervention was countered by a nationwide struggle, but the retrogressive rebel leadership, instead of using this common cause to unify the Afghan people, used the opportunity to further deepen and widen tribal, linguistic, regional and communal differences. I would like to quote from an article by Gordan Adams which appeared in *The Times* of London on 7 February 1989.

In the South and East, traditional tribal customs and rivalries remain strong. It is among these people that ex-King Zahir Shah commands most respect and support. In the centre of the country, the Hazara people — most of them are Shi'as, unlike the Sunni majority — are well-armed and politically more conscious than ever before, thanks mainly to Iranian help and influence. Afghanistan's fledgling

sense of national identity has been all but lost.

Seen in this light, the future of Afghanistan is bleak in the extreme. Reality should not be disregarded simply because it is bitter, a failing which certain western intellectuals are subject to. They argue that after a rebel victory, a civil war can be ruled out because after a decade of fighting, the Afghan people are tired of death and destruction and would like to live in peace. These over-optimistic commentators seem to think that Afghan history began with Soviet military intervention and will end with a rebel victory after the Soviet pullout. Had Afghanistan been, say, post-1945 Europe, perhaps such optimism would have been justified, but it is not, and such are the compulsions of Afghan history and tradition that in order to survive, it is essential to settle blood feuds. After taking part in the 1897 Afghan wars, Winston Churchill wrote: "The reality is that every inhabitant is a soldier from the very first day he is old enough to hurl a stone, till the last day he has the power to pull a trigger." Churchill was right; war-weariness is alien to Afghan psychology, tradition and society.

A brief analysis of Dr Najibullah and the PDPA's internal and external compulsions and the chances of their survival seems to be in order at this point. Dr Najibullah is the weakest General-Secretary of the Party in its 24-year existence. The internal groupings in the Party continue to remain on the same lines as in the past. As far as Najibullah is concerned, he has to contend with opposition from the old Parcham cadre and deal with resistance offered to his leadership by the Khalqites. In the eyes of PDPA ideologues, Najibullah instead of being a Marxist is a progressive

Pushtun nationalist. His frequent appeals to the rebels to forge Afghan unity are seen as indications of his opportunism. Najibullah's further misfortune lies in the fact that his own brother sought refuge in the rebel camp, thus putting him under

a cloud in the eyes of old Party faithfuls. The rebels taking advantage of the opportunity, have used his brother as a propaganda weapon against him and have tried to discredit his leadership by saying that a man who cannot exercise any influence on his own family, cannot be capable of leading a nation.

Despite his gifts as a powerful Pushtu orator, Najibullah has been unable to persuade the rebels to join him in a national government. The fact is that the day he had come to power the chances of a national government had ceased to exist. Had the Soviet Union's purpose in coming to Afghanistan been the return of Afghan refugees and the establishment of a national government, 1980-81 would have been an ideal time for achieving both. On second thought, had this been the Soviet intention, there would have been no need for military intervention in the first place. In any case, so much blood has flowed in Afghanistan in the last nine years, that it is no longer possible for Najibullah and the rebels to make peace.

General Ziaul Haq's accidental death was greeted with much relief in Kabul. If one listened to the state radio, it felt as if Najibullah had won the eight-year long war in one breath. It is obvious that Najibullah was unable to sufficiently appreciate the deep influence exercised by the United States on Pakistan's ruling classes, political parties and state machinery, otherwise he would have known that policies would not change because faces had changed. (I had predicted while General Ziaul Haq was still alive that even after him, whichever party came to power, Pakistan's Afghan policy would continue to be governed by American dictates.

Anwar

AFGHAN NEWS 12/22

Mayor of Kabul criticises Soviet invasion

KABUL: The Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan was immoral, unnecessary and partly to blame for the country's current plight, a top government official said yesterday.

The remarks of Karim Masiq, the mayor of Kabul and member of the Central Committee of the ruling People's Democratic Party, were the first time a government official has openly criticised Moscow's decision to send troops to Afghanistan.

Mr Masiq, in an interview with Western reporters, also said his party, which for years has adhered to Marxist economic policies, now wants

the private sector to expand and help save Afghanistan's people from starvation.

Even private merchants selling stolen goods will not be prosecuted, he said, "because they are still involved in bringing necessary goods to the market".

Mr Masiq, a former political prisoner and short-story writer, was appointed on Wednesday to the Central Committee as the ruling party held its first plenum since Soviet troops withdrew in February.

Mr Masiq is a member of the Khalq, or Masses, faction of the ruling party. In 1979, he was on

the Central Committee and the policy-making Politburo when the Soviet troops entered Afghanistan.

"It is very clear that it was unnecessary," Mr Masiq said. "And it is only natural that the Afghanistan people would defend against the Soviet force."

Significantly, he did not criticise the United States or other countries for aiding the Muslim guerrillas, known as the Mujahedeen (holy warriors), during the Soviet involvement.

But he said they were wrong to continue supporting the rebels after the Soviets left Afghanistan.

"There are no Mujahedeen now," he said. "We are the Mujahedeen."

HKS &
SCMP

10/28

U.S. CUTS OFF ARMS TO AFGHAN FACTION

Fundamentalist Rebel Group, Accused of Killing Rivals, Loses Major Backing

By JOHN F. BURNS
Special to The New York Times

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan, Nov. 18 — After criticism in Congress and elsewhere, the United States appears to have sharply cut arms supplies to an Afghan guerrilla group that has been accused of attacking other factions in the seven-member rebel coalition.

Western diplomats said this week that under a new arms policy adopted in recent weeks by the Bush Administration, fighters belonging to a faction of the Islamic Party led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar were no longer receiving any direct supplies of munitions purchased with American money.

At a news conference here today, Mr. Hekmatyar condemned the American move, calling it "an attempt to liquidate us" and demanding that the United States agree to Soviet proposals for a mutual cutoff of all arms being funneled to the two sides in the Afghan conflict.

'An Afghan Khomeini'

Mr. Hekmatyar, a Muslim fundamentalist whose fighters have been accused of killing rival rebel figures and fighting other groups for supremacy in important regions of Afghanistan, has been the most worrisome of the Afghan rebel leaders supported by the United States.

But because of a preference shown for Mr. Hekmatyar by Gen. Mohammad Zia ul-Haq, Pakistan's military ruler until his death in an air crash in August 1988, and because the Central Intelligence Agency judged Mr. Hekmatyar's group to be the Pakistan-based rebel coalition's most efficient fighting force, he was favored for years in the supply of American-financed arms and ammunition.

At Congressional hearings this summer, Bush Administration officials were pressed to explain past American backing for Mr. Hekmatyar, who was described by some Afghan specialists as "an Afghan Khomeini."

The rebel leader, who is 42 years old, was strongly critical of the United States and what he has described as its "immoral" society even in the days when his fighters were receiving a third to a half of all American military aid to the Afghan rebels, valued over the years at hundreds of millions of dollars.

He has visited the United States only once, in 1985, and caused a stir on that occasion by refusing to meet President Reagan. His stand caused a planned White House session for the rebel leaders to be canceled.

Earlier this year, under pressure from American officials and from Pakistan's new civilian Government led by Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto the agency of the Pakistan military that acts as a conduit for the American arms, the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate, began reducing supplies going to the Hekmatyar group. But so other rebel groups based in Pakistan continued to complain that Mr. Hek

U.S. Divided on Soviet Afghan Stand

By ELAINE SCIOLO
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 15 — Bush Administration officials are divided over whether the Soviet President, Mikhail S. Gorbachev, and his aides signaled at the Malta summit that they were ready for a political settlement in Afghanistan that could exclude President Najibullah.

The war in Afghanistan remains an obstacle to better relations between Moscow and Washington, and both sides continue to ship arms. After the summit meeting, many American officials were encouraged that Mr. Gorbachev and Foreign Minister Eduard A. Shevardnadze were willing to discuss in more detail than before the need for a "transitional process" that would eventually result in a peaceful settlement in Afghanistan.

These officials said that Soviet talk about the need for self-determination was a healthy sign that they might accept a transfer of power from the current Soviet-backed leadership.

"The Soviets acknowledged that in the course of a political settlement a new leadership will eventually emerge and it is not foreordained that Najibullah be part of it," said an Administration official who closely follows Afghanistan. "This is a change from

Some hints of doing without Najibullah are read two ways.

earlier Soviet assertions that he must be part of the process and guaranteed a place in any future government of Afghanistan."

Another official said: "Hopes were raised a little in Malta that the process itself will be a genuine process whose outcome cannot be precooked. This is an encouraging point of departure and although no one is seeing it as a breakthrough, it is a positive turn in what has been a fairly sterile dialogue."

The national security adviser, Brent Scowcroft, gave the first hint that there had been some positive movement on Afghanistan when he said last week that the two sides are still far apart on proposals for resolving the Afghan problem, especially on the role for Mr. Najibullah. But, Mr. Scowcroft added, "I'm hopeful that there may be some progress able to be made, and that's why I would prefer not to describe it."

But other officials familiar with the

summit discussions believe that Moscow still is unwilling to sacrifice Mr. Najibullah, noting that Mr. Shevardnadze told Mr. Bush and Secretary of State James A. Baker 3d that he had made seven visits to the region and that Mr. Najibullah was getting stronger, not weaker. In such circumstances, Mr. Shevardnadze asked, how can the Soviet Union abandon him?

"In the mood of the summit, everyone was upbeat and a lot of people inside the Administration feel that when the Soviets talked about a transitional period they implicitly accepted that there would be a transfer of power from Najibullah," said one Administration official who takes a more pessimistic view. "But they didn't say that, and you can't infer that he won't be around at the end of the process."

A Meeting in Rome

Another official who has followed Afghanistan for years said that the Soviet approach is typical of Soviet behavior over the last two years: building up Mr. Najibullah while at the same time hinting "with a wink and a nod" that at end of the process he is dispensable.

Skeptics within the Administration also point to the fact that on the eve of the summit, Mr. Shevardnadze met for the first time in Rome with Zahir Shah, the exiled Afghan King, but gave no indication that the Soviet Union was willing to sacrifice Mr. Najibullah. Instead, Mr. Shevardnadze encouraged the former King to return to Afghanistan and take over as an honorary head of state in a power-sharing arrangement with the Kabul Government. The King repeated his long-held position that such an arrangement is neither desirable nor possible, adding that the Afghan people must decide their political fate.

The Soviets suggested at Malta three possibilities for a transitional period, including a dialogue among all the Afghan parties, a United Nations-sponsored conference and a cease-fire and a moratorium on arms shipments by both Washington and Moscow.

Until Malta, the Soviets have taken the position that Mr. Najibullah must be a part of any political process, while the American-backed Afghan rebels have insisted that they will never negotiate with him or his party.

NYT 12/16

matyar was still receiving a disproportionate amount of arms, and it was only recently that a tougher policy was applied, one that appears to have caused a serious arms shortage for some of Mr. Hekmatyar's field commanders.

"He's feeling the pinch," a diplomatic familiar with recent arms movements said, referring to Mr. Hekmatyar. Although he was vague about details, the diplomat indicated that the Hekmatyar group had been penalized because Mr. Hekmatyar has suspended his participation with recent arms movements and, through which an increasing portion of the American weapons are being channeled, and because many of the weapons are now going to coordinating groups set up by rebel field commanders, called shuras. In some regions, the military shuras have been boycotted by Hekmatyar fighters.

Short of Weapons

At today's news conference, Mr. Hekmatyar acknowledged that his fighters were short of weapons, but said that this was because of heavy fighting. In fact, diplomats say, much of the recent fighting by Mr. Hekmatyar's faction of the Islamic Party — a breakaway faction is led by another hard-liner, Yunis Khalis — has been against fighters of a rival rebel group, the Islamic Society led by Burhanuddin Rabbani. Numerous clashes between the two groups have been reported from widely separated areas of northern, eastern and southern Afghanistan, resulting in scores of rebel deaths.

Although Mr. Hekmatyar's behavior has been increasingly troublesome to officials supervising American aid to the rebels, they have been wary of isolating him for fear that he will break ranks permanently with the rebellion, and possibly even seek a separate accommodation with the Soviet-backed Government in Kabul.

His move today in calling for a joint cutoff of Soviet and American arms —

something that the rebels' provisional government has rejected, and which Mr. Hekmatyar himself opposed when President Mikhail S. Gorbachev suggested it to President Bush earlier this year — suggested that the American anxieties might be well founded.

"The two superpowers must cease their interferences and intervention in Afghanistan," Mr. Hekmatyar said. "They should cease supplying arms, and let Afghans go their own way."

He added that if the Soviet Union accepted the proposal and the United States did not, his fighters were prepared, if necessary, to "guarantee the stoppage of arms from the other side," meaning the United States.

But he did not say how this would be accomplished, and he did not completely shut the door to an accommodation with the other rebel groups, saying that "under the right conditions, which he did not specify, he might reject the provisional government."

THE NEW YORK TIMES 11/19



Bush & Gorbachev: Positive or Negative
Summitry?

Misery Replaces Hope in a Battered Afghanistan

By JOHN F. BURNS

Special to The New York Times

KABUL, Afghanistan — As a volley of guerrilla rockets pounded the airport in the Afghan capital on a bitterly cold December day, a conscript in the Government army standing sentry near the runway laid down his Kalashnikov rifle, spread a blanket on the ground, and prostrated himself in prayer.

In the 12th winter of their war, the Muslim faith is all that many Afghans have left to sustain their battered morale. Hopes for peace that flickered when Soviet troops withdrew from the conflict in February have dimmed, replaced by fears that the killing will go on indefinitely.

Since they defied predictions of an early collapse by fighting off a rebel attack on Jalalabad in March, Government forces have proven repeatedly that they can withstand the heaviest attacks that the rebels can mount.

Rebels Gain Little Ground

Sustained by the planeloads of Soviet weapons that pour into Kabul daily, Government troops have fought off rebel pressures at Charikar, Ghazni, Kabul, Kandahar, Khosht and Herat, denying the rebels control of any major center that they did not already hold when Soviet forces withdrew.

As the war goes on, prospects for peace seem dependent on how soon negotiations between the two sides, with the United States, Pakistan and the Soviet Union also involved, can lead to the removal of the Kabul leader, President Najibullah.

The United States insists that he must go; the Soviet Union has demanded that he stay until the establishment of a coalition government with the rebels. Reports persist that Washington and Moscow are considering bringing the deposed King, Mohammed Zahir Shah, into the negotiations, if not into the new political structure of the country.

Each day, new victims have joined the 1.3-million civilians estimated to have died since the Communists seized power in 1978. In Kabul alone, perhaps as many as 1,000 people have been killed since January by powerful American-supplied rockets that the guerrillas fire into residential areas from mountain redoubts. In Jalalabad and other cities, officials cite similar casualties among the civilian population.

Poor Prospects for Peace

While no count is kept of noncombatants killed by the Government's Scud-B missiles, a Soviet battlefield weapon with a one-ton warhead, more than 1,000 of the missiles have been fired from Kabul this year, as well as from a new missile base in the northern stronghold of Mazar-i-Sharif. Reports of accidental strikes on villages and other civilian targets abound.

Compounding the misery now that winter has returned, food is scarce and so is fuel. In Kabul, where temperatures from December through February plunge to 20 degrees below zero, many families, including thousands of rural refugees living in hillside shanties, face nights without heat and days standing in bakery lines for bread. The news has spread that it is the staple of the Afghan diet.

Hospitals are filled to the corridors with civilian wounded and war widows with children beg in every bazaar. On many streets, men, women and chil-

dren can be seen hopping on homemade crutches, limbless from the blasts of war.

But for many Afghans, the bitterest thing is the sense that prospects for peace are slipping away. In nine months of reporting on the war from the Government and rebel sides, this reporter has had hardly a day without being approached in bazaars and mosques and military encampments by people eager for news that might indicate that an end to the killing could be near.

"What do you bring us?" a bearded old man shouted in the forefront of the Pul-i-Heshti mosque, Kabul's largest, after a recent session of Friday prayers. Asked what he meant, the worshiper replied: "I want to know, what is the chance for peace?"

The Government View

Plotting a Future: What of Najibullah?

The question reflected a feeling that the war can end only when there is a major push by the United States and the Soviet Union. Early this month, as President Bush met Mikhail S. Gorbachev in Malta, thousands in Kabul rose before dawn to hear the short-wave news broadcasts that "Voice of America" and the British Broadcasting Corporation relay in Persian and Pashto, Afghanistan's principal languages, hopeful that the meeting would in some way ease the diplomatic deadlock that has developed over the war.

But the broadcasts reaching Kabul made virtually no mention of Afghanistan, leaving many Afghans with the sense that they have been overlooked in the superpowers' haste to dismantle confrontations elsewhere.

"We have become a relic of the cold war," Abdul Wil, an interview, "Foreign Minister, said in an interview. "Everywhere else, peace is breaking out. Only in Afghanistan must we have war."

American policy makers have said that the country may have to go through at least one more "season" of fighting, meaning until the end of 1990. By that, the officials seem to mean not that the rebels are likely to win the war outright, but that it may take a year or more to secure the condition that Washington and the rebels have set for negotiations — the removal of the 43-year-old Kabul leader, President Najibullah, and of some of his top associates.

Fear of the Secret Police

Among rebel leaders, they are held responsible for the war, and for their alleged involvement, particularly that of Mr. Najibullah, who headed the secret police from 1980 to 1986, in the killing of thousands of people in Kabul's interrogation centers and prisons.

Mr. Najibullah has said that nothing he may have done is any worse than the rebels' excesses, and he has set out to outlive a new, affable image, saying that the war had been a mistake in the past, that Marxism was a mistake, and hinting that he was opposed to the Soviet military intervention.

But memories are kept alive by the still-pervasive power of the secret police. Their unmarked vehicles still roar through Kabul's dusty streets, bearing grim-faced men in khaki uniforms without insignia. Nor has the fear of brutality been erased.

An official contemplating defection was asked why he delayed. He said that he had heard of another Government official who quit his job this summer in protest. "Some men came to his door, asked his son to fetch him, and shot him in the face," he said.

For now, top officials emphatically reject the rebel leaders' proposal that Mr. Najibullah give way to a new Kabul government headed by "good Muslims" associated with the current Government, but not linked to past excesses. Mr. Wakil, the Foreign Minister, said the United States, by backing a demand it knew would not be accepted, was disgusting that what it really sought was a rebel military victory.

"They want revenge on the Soviet Union for Vietnam," he said. "Their side was totally defeated in Saigon, so they want our side to be totally defeated here."



Associated Press

Afghan peace negotiations are being hampered by disagreement over when President Najibullah should leave office.

The Soviet View

Kremlin Questions, And Coup Attempts

In practice, the position may not be so fixed. For one thing, there are indications that Mr. Najibullah has escaped at least two coup attempts this year. A senior general in one of the Kabul Government's provincial commands, killed within the last month by a rebel mine, told a Western reporter not long before he died that Mr. Najibullah had a narrow escape in April when a plot by Government troops to turn guns on him during the annual Revolution Day parade was uncovered. At the last minute, the general said, the parade was moved up a day, to April 26, and the plotters were arrested.

In July, another coup attempt apparently was foiled, that one reportedly involving the Defense Minister, Col. Gen. Shanawaz Tanai. The same general who told of the April plot said that General Tanai and other members of the governing party's hard-line wing had conspired to overthrow Mr. Najibullah.

According to that account, the Defense Minister and other plotters were jailed, but were released after the Soviet Ambassador in Kabul, Yuli M.

Vorontsov, since recalled to Moscow, visited Mr. Najibullah in the Arg-i-Shahi palace and demanded their reinstatement.

Soon after, the Soviet Foreign Minister, Eduard A. Shevardnadze, made a hasty, heavily guarded visit to the Afghan capital, ostensibly to reassure Mr. Najibullah of Moscow's support.

But according to a Government official, Mr. Shevardnadze's secret task was to impress on the feeding camps that the Kremlin would cut off the \$250 million in arms that Moscow is airlifting to Kabul each month if the factionalism was not suppressed. By that account, Mr. Najibullah, General Tanai and other top officials involved were required to shake hands in Mr. Shevardnadze's presence and renounce any further plots.

A Nightmare for the Kremlin

Since July, little has been heard of General Tanai as Defense Minister, and Mr. Najibullah has been put under tighter security than ever. Mostly, he moves outside the palace only during the nightly curfew, in an armored Mercedes-Benz supplied by the Soviet Union. Bodyguards with machine guns, dressed in Soviet military fatigues, surround him wherever he goes.

For the Kremlin, finding a safe footing in this quagmire has been a nightmare. On the record, Soviet officials in

Kabul, like Boris N. Pastukhov, the new Ambassador, insist that Mr. Najibullah will be supported as long as it takes to get the Kabul settlement. Moscow has proposed, which would include the provisions for a coalition government, to be followed by elections under United Nations supervision.

But a senior Kabul official traveling abroad within the last week told associates recently that Mr. Najibullah had had several secret meetings in Moscow this year with Mr. Gorbachev, involving 24-hour round trips aboard Soviet military planes, and that on a recent visit the Soviet leader asked him to sign a statement affirming that his Government would quit once an outline settlement is worked out.

The story implied that the Kremlin may no longer be asking whether Mr. Najibullah should be replaced, but how. If so, the time may be approaching when Mr. Najibullah's pledges on the subject will be tested.

"Give me a guarantee of peace, then, if Najibullah is the problem, I will step aside," he said in an interview in June. If the peace has been won without the pledge, it is partly because the personal costs seem likely to be high. To assure his safety, and that of his wife and two daughters, it seems almost certain that any deal that takes Mr. Najibullah out of the palace will carry him to exile in the Soviet Union.

The Rebel View

Feuding, Disarray, A Turn to Opium

The factionalism is no less acute on the other side of the war. In recent months, so much of the rebel groups' energies have been expended in fighting among themselves that outsiders often have been led to wonder if anything united them other than their resolve to rid Afghanistan of Soviet troops.

Instead of the common front that the United States and Pakistan hoped to forge in February when they pressured the seven Pakistan-based rebel parties

into establishing a provisional government, the main rebel groups — in addition to the Pakistan-based groups, there are eight smaller parties based in Iran — have resorted to what has often seemed like a full-scale war of their own.

Some of the bitterest fighting has involved battles between two rebel groups that gained staunch reputations for their effectiveness against Soviet troops, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's faction of the Islamic Party, and the Islamic Society, led by Burnahuddin Rabbani.

In widely separated regions of the country, the two groups have traded ambushes, and killed some of each others' most experienced field commanders. In Peshawar, the Pakistan city that serves as the main rebel headquarters, a new round of political assassinations has swept through rebel ranks, with prominent figures machine-gunned in rickshaws, bombed in their cars, or shot in the head and dumped in the city's canals.

Elsewhere, other rebel groups have virtually given up fighting, either because they have made deals with Mr. Najibullah, they want to save their weapons for the power struggle that many foresee when the Kabul Government collapses, or because they have found more promising enterprises.

Among those is a flourishing trade in opium. At least 700 tons of opium were exported from rebel-controlled areas of Afghanistan last year, making the country the world's second-largest source of the raw material that is processed into heroin, after the "golden triangle" of Southeast Asia.

In one region, around the old royal city of Kandahar, the Government and one of the main rebel groups, Ahmad Gailani's National Islamic Front of Afghanistan, have arranged a truce.

In the face of bitter opposition from other rebel groups, which continue to bombard the city and to attack Government convoys, Mr. Gailani's men move freely in and out of the city, leaving their weapons at Government checkpoints on the way in and collecting them as they depart.

The Government commander, Lieut. Gen. Nurul Haq Ullumi, a graduate of American and Soviet military training schools, meets regularly with Gailani commanders in his office in what was once the King's palace, and holds banquets in their honor.

"Here, the war is all but over," the general, a man of 46 who is often talked about as an interim successor to Mr. Najibullah, told a recent visitor.

Role for the Afghan King

What appears to have brought General Ullumi and his rebel associates together is a common link, as members of the Durrani aristocracy that has provided Afghanistan with its kings, to the exiled monarch, Mohammed Zahir Shah. In that sense, what they have worked out is a local anomaly, since Kandahar has long been a royal stronghold. But recently, the Kandahar arrangements have come to be seen as a prototype for something broader.

That the Soviet Union is interested seemed clear when Mr. Shevardnadze broke away from an official visit to Italy with Mr. Gorbachev that preceded the Malta summit to meet with the 75-year-old King, who lives in Rome on a generous stipend from the Saudi royal family.

Mr. Najibullah has repeatedly invited the King, who reigned for 40 years before his overthrow in 1973, to play a role in ending the war, and the King has said that he is willing if he can be convinced that there is broad enough support.

In the bazaars of Kabul, Kandahar and Herat, interviews with merchants and their customers in recent months indicated vigorous support for the return of the King, if only from nostalgia for a time when the country was at peace. But apart from Mr. Gailani's group, most of the rebels have been unenthusiastic, and one faction, Mr. Hekmatyar's, has opposed the idea to the point of assassinating Peshawar-based royalists who have pressed for the restoration.

For now, most diplomats who have followed the war see little prospect of an early return to peace, under the King or anybody else. Even the removal of Mr. Najibullah, a point on which there appears to be the widest agreement, might not bring peace closer, since it could be the prelude to new and still more complex strife in which the Kabul Government could split into warring factions, taking with it any semblance of central authority.

One Westerner who has watched events here for nearly 30 years sees that as the final tragedy of the war.


"Afghanistan has already ceased to exist, in the sense of a country that anybody governs," he said. "And whatever happens now, it will not rise again for a very long time."



En avant vers un Afghanistan uni.
(Dessin de Behrendt, «De Telegraaf», Amsterdam 1989)

NEW YORK TIMES

DECEMBER 17, 1989



Afghan rebels converging on Jalalabad last March.

Reifol/David Stewart-Smith

British Group Clears Mines Of Kabul War

By JOHN F. BURNS
Special to The New York Times

KABUL, Afghanistan, Dec. 2 — Two months ago, Guy Willoughby shed the natty suit that he has frequently worn in Kabul, dropped to his hands and knees off a highway north of here, and worked his way through a Soviet minefield.

Using a metal detector, a probe and his hands, Mr. Willoughby, a former Guards officer in the British Army, lifted enough mines to clear a narrow path. That done, the 29-year-old Englishman and a companion, Paul Jefferson, cleared another, smaller minefield nearby.

Back in Kabul, Mr. Willoughby, great-grandson of a former viceroy of India, departed for a vacation in England, where his passions include horse breeding and polo.

Mr. Willoughby, director of a London-based group that calls itself the Hazardous Areas Life-Support Organization — the initials are HALO — will be back, planning for a role in what is likely to be the most complicated mine-clearing operation ever undertaken.

By its estimates and that of other organizations that have assessed the problem, including the United Nations, 10 years of war have left at least three million unexploded mines lying in the mountain gulleys and hardscrabble tracts of Afghanistan.

Children Are Prominent Victims

More than any other weapon, mines have been the scourge of the war, maiming and killing tens of thousands of people. The hospitals of Kabul and other cities are filled to the corridors with victims, many of them children who lost limbs and eyes when they accidentally triggered one of the deadly explosives scattered across the country by Soviet forces and their Afghan Government allies, or by the Muslim guerrillas who have opposed them.

Even when the war ends, the dying will not. According to Alexander Blyth, Mr. Willoughby's assistant here, poor mapping of many minefields — and the failure to map many of them at all — will create huge problems.

Because of the heavy spring runoff of rain from the Hindu Kush mountains, many of the mines that have been mapped have moved, perhaps as much as a mile from their original positions. "It could be 20 or 30 years before the problem is under control," said Mr. Blyth, 28 years old, and like Mr. Willoughby, a former Guards officer.

For the moment, there is little to be done. The clearing done by the two men south of the town of Pul-i-Khumri, along the Salang highway that connects Kabul to the Soviet Union, was to test the accuracy of Soviet mine maps and to show the Afghan Army's engi-

neering corps how the job is done. The Kabul forces have little experience in lifting mines, and scarcely any incentive as long as the war continues, to begin the work. There is also little faith that the job can be done safely.

"Afghans hate mines," Mr. Blyth said. "Their instinct is to get as far away from them as possible."

Little Soviet Instruction

The mine maps that do exist were delivered to the Afghans by the Soviet forces 48 hours before the Soviet troops pulled out in February, with little or no attempt, according to Afghan officers, to explain them. Mr. Willoughby has seen the maps, and photographed many of them, creating an archive that could be crucial if fighting should threaten the Government's records. But the indications from the Pul-i-Khumri experiment suggest that many of the maps may be of limited value.

"It was very much a matter of the diligence of the individual Soviet field commander," Mr. Blyth said. "Some of them just planted the mines and forgot about them, without any record at all. Others drew very inaccurate maps, and there were those who did the job responsibly."

In laying mines, that involves observance of the Geneva conventions on warfare, which require combatants to map and mark all minefields, and to surround them, usually with barbed wire.

Soviet mines account for the majority of those distributed around the country, and the rebels have made widespread use of them. The result is a hodgepodge of mine types, from huge Soviet devices that can be hung in trees to American claymores, Italian plastic mines that have acoustic-detonation mechanisms and Chinese copies of Soviet devices dating to World War II. Belgian, British and Swedish mines have found their way here, too.

A Particularly Insidious Kind

As in Vietnam, extensive use has also been made of booby traps in dolls, toys, pens and matchboxes.

But the biggest problem has arisen from the Soviet practice of airdropping mines, generally in canisters that exploded in the air and scattered up to 360 tiny "butterfly" mines. Many of the mines lacked the timing devices that are supposed to disarm them after a 24-to-48-hour period, and in others, the timing mechanisms failed.

Worse, the Soviet forces appear to have kept no maps of the airdropped devices. Almost every day brings more children to Kabul's hospitals who have lost limbs after picking up green-and-brown explosives that are about the size and weight of cigarette packages.

In Pakistan, American and British experts, among others, are training Afghan refugees to recognize and disarm mines. But the British organization, so far, is the only foreign group to have seen the mine maps, and the only one to have attempted to work through the Kabul Government. With suspicion abounding on every side, it has faced an uphill battle.

"People see these former British officers heading for the Defense Minis-

Toys of death

WARS kill long after the guns fall silent. Of all the dangers that will face the 5m Afghan refugees on their return from the camps in Pakistan and Iran, none is more deadly than the millions of land mines that were scattered by both sides' armies, most of which are still lying in wait for the unwary.

Under international law the marking of minefields and making them safe after a war is the responsibility of the side that planted them. In practice many minefields in Afghanistan were not even mapped, and most of the mines are still in place.

A programme sponsored by the United Nations to try to prepare Afghans to deal with these nasty contraptions has just marked its half-way stage (in time, if not in achievement). Now that winter has set in, the British army team that has been training Afghans to deal with mines has stopped its operations at Quetta until the spring. Training will continue at a second site, at Peshawar, through the winter months.

The programme aims to show Afghans how to identify mines (some are disguised as toys) and to train some 15,000 people in mine disposal. A voluntary American aid organisation, the International Rescue Committee, is in charge of mine spotting. Mine-clearance training is being carried out by experts from Australia, Canada, France, New Zealand, Norway and the United States, as well as from Britain. Turkey and Italy are due to send teams to Quetta next year.

A mine-disposal course, conducted through an interpreter, takes about two weeks. Each four-man team trains a class of about 20 students, who are selected by the mujaheddin resistance. Afghans are also being trained as instructors, to speed up the work. A bonus is that they will not need interpreters.

At the end of his course the trainee is given a basic tool kit and sent back to the refugee camps to await the end of the fighting and the return of the refugees. A big worry is that as time passes the kits will disappear into the bazaars and the knowledge gained during the training will fade. The UN people are beginning to think about refresher courses. Unless the mines are cleared, the reconstruction of Afghanistan is going to be held up indefinitely.

try with their briefcases, and they jump to conclusions," Mr. Blyth said. "Pity, really, when all we're trying to do is help."

NYT 12/3

A little kingdom in Afghanistan

FROM A CORRESPONDENT IN TALOQAN

PART of Afghanistan has achieved a sort of peace. This is the bit in the north-east run by Ahmad Shah Massoud. In the war against the Afghan government and its Soviet backers, Mr Massoud has been the most successful of the guerrilla commanders. Now he is building a civil administration in five provinces on the edge of the Hindu Kush: Takhar, Badakhshan, Konduz, Baghlan and Kapisa.

His base is Taloqan in Takhar province. And a prosperous place it looks. The bazaars are stacked with local produce and foreign goods: Imperial Leather soap from England, medicines from Bulgaria, turbans and pullovers from Pakistan, condoms from America. Much of the foreign stuff is imported through Kabul. Buses leave daily for the capital, travelling through government-held Konduz along roads controlled by the mujaheddin.

The contact between Massoud territory and Kabul is the big surprise for the visitor. It contradicts the picture of a country endlessly fighting a bitter civil war. Women, children and old men travel freely between government and mujaheddin territory. Young men may cross army checkpoints if they have completed their military service.

The Kabul regime of President

Najibullah not merely tolerates this commerce; it has his full support. The government, it seems, has come to an accommodation with a number of *shuras*—local councils run by the mujaheddin and tribal leaders. The mujaheddin are given money, food, fuel, even weapons, in exchange for a promise not to attack government convoys or outposts.

Taloqan fell to the mujaheddin in August 1988. The Afghan army abandoned the town one morning and the mujaheddin moved in. Because of their hatred of the government they foolishly did their best to sack the place. They wrecked the cotton-packing factory, smashed the electricity plant and the water works and stripped the doors, windows and electrical wiring from every government building in town.

Now the damaged buildings are being repaired. The hospital has been reopened (its young doctors treat some 100 patients daily, free of charge) and there is a network of village clinics. Medicines and equipment come from western aid agencies in Pakistan. Taloqan's secondary school—doorless, windowless and chairless—teaches 900 boys Dari (the language of the local Tajiks), Pashto (the language of Afghanistan's majority), Arabic, English, the sciences and Islam. The *shura*'s education committee runs village schools, in mosques or under trees. The ascetic Mr Massoud has banned smoking as un-Islamic and unhealthy.

Reconstruction has begun throughout Massoud's domain, which includes the Panjshir valley, devastated by nine Soviet offensives. New roads are being built and others improved—sometimes by captured government soldiers. Mines are being cleared. Funds come partly from mujaheddin headquarters in Peshawar and partly from taxation. The *shura* levies taxes on exports of lapis lazuli from Badakhshan, on emeralds from the Panjshir, on sheep and goats sold for meat and on




Massoud is in a hurry

vehicles travelling to and from Kabul. Western aid agencies help with health, education and getting agriculture into decent shape.

Mr Massoud's *shura* is made up of commanders from all five north-eastern provinces, but its authority is not absolute. Within his mountainous fief three cities are still held by Kabul; the town of Khanabad is under the joint administration of the Peshawar-based mujaheddin alliance; and several pockets of land are controlled by mujaheddin commanders with no affiliation to Mr Massoud.

His plan to capture the remaining government towns in his area, before contemplating an assault on Kabul, has been frustrated by a bloody power struggle between his Islamic party, the Jamiat-i Islami, and the more extreme Hesb-i Islami of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. The dispute has shaken Mr Massoud's faith in a united mujaheddin victory. Neither does he believe that a political settlement with the Najibullah government can work. In the absence of either, it may be that other regions of Afghanistan will develop along the lines of Massoud's little kingdom. The country would be fractured into a Kabul-based central power and a number of fiefs run by local strong men. Which is how Afghanistan was divided in the past.



First aid used as PR ploy

The International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) refused to build hospitals in Mujahideen-controlled areas when the Supervisory Council proposed the idea to the visiting delegation of that organization in August.

A delegation of ICRC visited the North in summer and talked to Com. Massoud about the medical and prisoners-of-war issues.

On the prisoners issue, they wanted to collect data about Soviet POWs

and seek their release. They met some Soviet prisoners in the custody of the Supervisory Council who refused to go back to the Soviet Union.

ICRC offered treatment of wounded Mujahideen at its hospital in Kabul which was rejected. The Mujahideen then asked ICRC to open hospitals in the liberated areas. The delegation said it was unable to respond immediately.

A representative of ICRC who had participated in Tehran Seminar on Afghanistan told Afghans that his organization cannot open hospitals in the liberated areas unless they are supplied through Kabul. The Mujahideen do not agree with such an arrangement.

ICRC's readiness to give first aid to the Mujahideen serves no medical purpose. It is just a mean of contact with the war fronts.

The ICRC delegation was carrying radios in order to keep in touch with their Kabul office. The Mujahideen refused to allow this for security reasons.

ICRC has sent many delegations to liberated areas in Afghanistan, but so far has done no major medical work in Afghanistan. ICRC's only hospital in Afghanistan is in Kabul. In theory it treats all Afghans, but in practice treats only those under control of the regime.

AFGHANews October 15, 1989.

Tailoring workshop for refugee widows

A women's delegation from UNICEF visited the tailoring workshop of Ummohatul-Momineen girls school in Peshawar on November 26.

In this workshop orphan girls and widows are taught tailoring so that they can earn their living through constructive work. AfghaNews

THE ECONOMIST DECEMBER 16 1989

From the Editor:

If your FORUM has a pink piece of paper in it, it's time to renew your subscription. We hope you will fill out the form & return it to us with your check post haste. No pink slip? You don't owe us any money yet.

Obviously this is not a profit-making enterprise. The FORUM is an entirely voluntary operation - no grants, no salaries, no royalties, no nothing. Subscriptions are our only source of revenue so we value your support. We also depend on you to keep us informed about what's happening. Please send us clippings (identified as to source & date), cartoons, reviews, information about events, organizations, new books, gossip, suggestions, whatever; as long as it has some relationship to Afghans or Afghanistan, we relish it. The deadline for the next issue is 2/15.

Now for our annual all-purpose disclaimer: The FORUM prints what is being said, thought & done about Afghanistan from as many sources as possible. You can believe it or not. We spell names & places as they appear in the source cited as we wouldn't presume to try to standardize the transliteration of Dari and/or Pushtu (Pashtu, Pushto!).

Small print is still with us but, at long last, we have come up with a FORUM magnifying instrument which we shall send to all of you who renew your subscriptions.

Some of the print in this issue is interesting, some of it astounding (see p. 36, for example), & yes, a lot of it you've heard or read before - & no doubt will read again. Only the numbers change & nobody believes then anyway.

We enjoy putting the FORUM together. We hope you like to read it, depressing as some of the news/gossip may be, & will want to continue receiving it.

May the 1990s bring a semblance of peace to Afghanistan.

EVENTS

The WORLD MUSIC INSTITUTE will sponsor a concert, "Music of Afghanistan," on 11/13 at 8 p.m. at the Washington Square Church, 135 West 4th Street, New York City. Ezatullah Mujadiddi, his son Omar & British ethnomusicologists John Baily & Veronica Doubleday are to be the performers. Tickets are \$12.

"Roses & Nightingales" was the title of a series of programs on Afghan music presented by John Baily on Monday evenings during November & December over the Columbia University radio station, WKCR.

Stephen Galster gave a paper on "Washington, Moscow & the Struggle for Kabul" at the Mid-Atlantic Regional Association for Asian Studies conference at Georgetown University on 10/21/89.

The Center for Asian Studies at the University of Texas (Austin) held a discussion on "The Afghan Legacy" on 10/20/89.

"War & Peace in Afghanistan" was the topic of a day-long meeting held at the Carnegie Endowment for Int'l Peace in Washington, D.C. on 11/14. Selig Harrison & Diego Cordovez co-chaired the session.

The ISLAMIC RELIEF AGENCY & the RECONSTRUCTION BUREAU OF AFGHANISTAN held a 3-day seminar in Peshawar in November to discuss refugee rehabilitation & the reconstruction of Afghanistan.

Ohio State University's Middle East Center will host a conference on "Soviet & American Relations with Turkey, Iran & Afghanistan: Advances & Setbacks" on May 6-7, 1990. Information is available from Jeff Roberts, Asst. Dir., MESC, OSU, 308 Dulles Hall, 230 West 17th Ave., Columbus, OH 43210.

The AFGHANISTAN RELIEF COMMITTEE's 3rd Int'l Conference of Afghanistan Humanitarian Support Organizations (CAHSO) will take place Feb. 9-11 at the Earbizon Hotel, 140 East 63rd St., New York City. This year's topic is "The Changing Relationships Between PVOs & the Afghan Resistance, Interim Gov't & People." The Conference fee is \$175 (\$60 for the Saturday afternoon session only). For more information, call the ARC at (212) 355-2931.

Tradition creates snag for women's education

The women's wing of Jami'at Islami in Iran publishes a paper called Nida-i-Khuaharan-e-Musulman (The Call of the Muslim Sisters).

The paper publishes articles about military and political aspects of Jihad, family life, women's activities, Afghan cooking and other interesting subjects. The paper is edited by Huma Faizy.

The women's branch of Jami'at Islami in Iran is quite active. Its members participated in the first and second seminars on Afghanistan held in Tehran.

The activities of the women branch of Jami'at Islami in Pakistan and Iran prove that contrary to enemy propaganda and the perception held in the west, the Mujahideen, and particularly Jami'at, does not oppose the activities of Muslim women which take place in the framework of Islamic Sharia.

Opening of girls' schools inside and outside Afghanistan is another proof of Jami'at commitment to the well-being of the women.

One should be aware that part of the problems facing the women in the Muslim world, including Afghanistan, are rooted in tradition, not from religion. For example, Afghan tradition does not permit calling women by name in front of strangers. The people have started to think that calling the women by their name is un-Islamic. Women are called the mother of so-and-so and the sister, or wife of so-and-so instead of being called by their names.

It is well-known that calling women by their names is not an anti-Islamic act. The Holy Quran talks about Mary, the mother of Jesus Christ (peace be upon him), the wife of Adam (peace be upon him), and wife of Solomon (peace be upon him), the sister of Moses (peace be upon him), and wives of the Prophet of Islam (peace be upon him).

When Taraki's regime took power, he sent his officials to take a census of the population. In the forms that families were supposed to fill out, there were columns in which the names of the women and their ages were to be written down.

People already suspicious of the communists' policies started to react, and the war against communist rule started.

Daud and King Zahir faced similar problems because they wanted to impose reforms which emphasized western values. Abolishing Hijab, and compulsory Western dress for women in schools and offices, antagonized the ma-

jority of Afghans, who found these policies un-Islamic.

These policies led to the confinement of educated women in the cities and suspicious among women about schools run by the government.

Traditional concepts which are thought to be religious need careful handling. The stupid mistakes committed by the communists and the monarchy are worth remembering.

The Islamic parties in Afghanistan have to solve the problem in clever way. They have to persuade people instead of forcing them. They also need to show that western dress for women is not part of education and that one can learn without abandoning traditional and Islamic dress.

An Indian Muslim scholar, Prof. Mohammad Anwar, came to Kabul University during the time of the king. He belonged to one of the Islamic parties in India and had visited Kabul University to persuade Muslim youth to adopt Islamic values.

He told his audience that he was surprised by the way girl students of the Kabul University and school were dressed. They wore western dress and that was their official uniform. He said that the education was a business of the mind, not of the trousers. Our stupid leaders of the time had linked the two, in order to appear progressive in the eyes of outsiders.

Most Mujahideen leaders see problems in polling

Sayyed Ahmad Gailani, the elections commissioner of the AIG, told reporters in Islamabad on November 22 that elections for a Shura will be held by April 1990.

He did not disclose the procedure for casting votes but said that every Muslim Afghan above the age of 25 can contest, and every Afghan above the age of 16 can vote.

Since elections will be held in Afghanistan, refugees camps in Iran and Pakistan and other countries, it must be a complex process requiring a huge administrative body.

Two parties, Hezb Islami (Hikmatyar) and NIFA, insist on elections to endorse the interim government, but others see practical difficulties on the way of holding polls.

In order to hold elections in the refugee camps in Iran, the government of Iran must cooperate. This cooperation depends largely on agreement between Iran-based and Pakistan Mujahideen parties on how to hold elections.

Some parties are afraid that due to the war, holding elections may not be possible inside the country, and elections will be only held in the refugee

AFGHANews December 15, 1989

WEATHER

December 9, 1989
Quas 18, 1368

	Max (C°)	Min.
Kabul	7	1
	rain 4mm	
Salang	4	-6
	rain 6mm, snow 26 cm	
Jabulseraj	9	4
Chekhcharan	3	-16
Shiberghan	20	4
Mazar	17	2
Kunduz	15	5
Farah	19	6
Zaranj	23	7
Jalalabad	27	8

diplomat defects

Amanullah Nazari, a regime diplomat, has defected to the Mujahideen, MIDIA reported.

The 55-year-old diplomat said that after Najib became the president in 1986, agents of Khad, the regime's secret police, were sent to Kabul regime missions abroad, posing as diplomats.

He estimated that 80 percent of the regime's diplomatic corps are Khad agents.

Mr. Nazari was the director of studies and research at Kabul's Ministry of the Foreign Affairs. October 15, 1989

Panorama fails to present fair picture of war

A 50-minute documentary film on Afghanistan shown on BBC Television has painted a disproportionate picture of civilian casualties in the cities, and has drawn incorrect conclusions about the need to continue Jihad.

The first part of the film deals with reasons of the failure of the Mujahideen to defeat the communist regime in Kabul.

According to the film, when the Mujahideen frontal attacks failed, they turned to random rocketing of the cities, which inflicts losses on the civilian population.

Several scenes of children, old men and women being injured in Kabul and Kandahar are shown.

In order to balance the film the director has tried to address the destruction of villages and killing of civilians by the regime, but the effort is futile: the sight of destroyed villages do not have the same impact as a weeping old woman trained to cry anti-Mujahideen and anti-American slogans.

The film does not put the horrible stories of the present in historic perspective, and gives the false impression that the Mujahideen and their supporters are responsible for what it calls "a purposeless war."

The Soviets' massive arming of the regime is not highlighted in the film, and the regime's peace slogans are taken seriously.

The film shows the discontent of some Mujahideen about random firing of rockets into the cities, but does not mentioned the reservations most Mujahideen harbor about harming civilians. Without their self-restraint, the Mujahideen would have disrupted city life far more and civilian casualties would have been much higher.

The documentary stresses the controversial role of American weapons have played in prolonging the fighting, but the advice of Peter Thomsen, the American special envoy to the Mujahideen, that regime's killing of civilians should also be documented, seems reasonable.

Why are the Soviets not blamed for the continuation of war which they started, and now continue to fuel by sending arms to their puppets?

Finally, the film calls the Jihad against the communist regime meaningless, an offensive remark borrowed from Russian diplomats.

AFGHANews November 1

AFGHANews Vol 5, No 23 December 1, 1989

In Skulduggery's City, Afghan Feuds Find Home

By JOHN F. BURNS

Special to The New York Times

PESHAWAR, Pakistan, Nov. 15 — In the capital of the Northwest Frontier Province, winter is the season for polo. On fields where officers of the British garrison once sharpened their skills, pilots of the Pakistan Air Force thunder back and forth, as skilled on horseback as they are practicing dog-fights at the Khyber Pass in American-made F-16's. Between chukkers, valets move quietly among the players with pots of sugary tea.

In the face of such ritual, life in Peshawar can seem suspended, for a moment, from the turbulent currents of contemporary Pakistan. But the illusion passes. For 2,500 years, the city has stood at one of the most troubled crossroads in Central Asia, where the mountain fastnesses of Afghanistan give way to the subcontinental plains. Between conquest and commerce, there is little in the way of artfulness and villainy that has not flourished here, and there has been nothing in recent years to diminish the tradition.

For a decade, Peshawar has served as the base camp for the Muslim guerrillas fighting the Soviet-backed Government in Afghanistan. In addition to rebel leaders who live here in tightly guarded homes, waves of Afghan refugees have been drawn to the city. More than 3.5 million are registered at camps along the Afghan frontier. As many as 800,000 of these have settled in Peshawar, more than doubling the city's population, and perhaps a million more live at camps within 30 miles. To hear local people tell it, effective government has become more of a pretense than ever.

It's a mad job, quite mad," said Mohammed Tariq Arbab, the Mayor, in office barely six weeks and overwhelmed already by the problems that surge around him.

Blandishment and Promise

On a recent morning, an interview with Mr. Arbab was conducted over the shouts of petitioners who had pushed their way past his secretary, seeking every imaginable favor: a relative's release from prison, a sweeper's job for a cousin, something done about garbage piled up in the bazaars. Although much that was sought lay beyond his powers, the 40-year-old Mayor survived by blandishment and promise, scribbling his name on scraps of paper thrust forward by the crowd.

To administer a city with a population in the region of two million, Mr. Arbab and his aides have to get by with a budget of 160 million rupees, or about \$9.5 million. On this, there is no prospect of effective sanitation, much less of repairing collapsing water and electricity systems. Traffic that clogs the city from dawn to dusk has turned



The New York Times/John F. Burns

The Qissa Khawani bazaar in Peshawar, Pakistan, where Pakistani and Afghan traders outdoor each other in trading nuts, waistcoats, blankets, tinware,

luggage and thousands of other wares. At least some of the business seems likely to retreat across the border if the Afghan conflict ends.

what was once a five-minute journey into a 45-minute battle.

For many citizens, the city's problems might be bearable without the violence. According to local parlance, Peshawar stands at the center of the "Kalashnikov culture," a patchwork of skulduggery stitched together with the universal weapon of late 20th-century wars, the AK-47 automatic rifle. Whether it is a matter of running tons of heroin from the poppy fields of Afghanistan, of the ceaseless skirmishing among rival rebel groups, or of simply letting off steam, the Chinese version of the weapon, available fresh from its wrappings at local gun shops for the equivalent of \$800, springs readily to hand, along with machine pistols, grenades and bombs.

The police have been virtually powerless in face of impenetrable Afghan feuds. Bodies float floating in canals, rebel commanders machine-gunned, others who simply disappear, have become routine. So too have explosions in the local bazaars.

At least 100 city residents, and perhaps as many as 300, are said to have

been shot to death this year, in incidents so common that householders can pause over supper to fetch a collection of bullets plucked from their walls to show visitors. Sometimes the shooting is intended to kill. More often, according to the police, it is the byproduct of a wedding celebration, or of one rebel group demonstrating its firepower to another.

The Frontier Post, an English-language newspaper, reported eight "Kalashnikov" killings on a single day recently, including those of a man said to have been hit in his car by "highwaymen," another whose body was discovered "riddled with bullets" near a refugee camp, and still another who was mistakenly killed instead of his brother, a young man who, according to the newspaper's account, had "disgraced the daughter" of the killer.

Although the violence has increased sharply during the Afghan war, only the most starchy local residents blame the refugees for all of it. Under the British, a Peshawar posting was regarded as unusually hazardous, for reasons that went beyond 20th-century Afghan wars. The stained-glass windows of abandoned churches attest to the men of British regiments killed in skirmishes with Pathan tribesmen.

More than most Central Asian people, the Pathans, a people split by

the Durand Line that Britain drew as the frontier between Afghanistan and what is now Pakistan, are renowned for their stiff pride, their pursuit of blood feuds and their skill with guns.

Pathans are fabled, too, for their skill in commerce, and for this, even skeptical local people acknowledge, Peshawar has much to thank the Afghans. At the Qissa Khawani bazaar, Pakistani and Afghan traders outdoor each other in trading nuts, waistcoats, blankets, underwear, luggage and a thousand other wares. Merchants with little but trinkets on view can be seen engrossed on the telephone, apparently closing deals, and one trader has installed a fax machine at curbside.

At least some of the business seems likely to retreat across the border if the Afghan conflict ends. One merchant who is making plans is Shamsuddin, a carpet dealer much favored among the 2,000 foreigners here.

Sitting cross-legged among a stock piled ceiling-high around the walls of a shadowy den, Mr. Shamsuddin said he had abandoned his previous business, as a supplier of tents and other wares to the Pakistan Army, when rebels and refugees began flooding Peshawar with carpets. "Soon, maybe, the supply will be finished," Mr. Shamsuddin said. He chuckled, and added, "Then, maybe, I go back to tents."

AMERICAN NUMISMATIC SOCIETY FELLOWSHIP

ANS Frances M. Schwartz Fellowship. This fellowship supports the work and study of numismatic and museum methodology at the ANS museum. Candidates must have completed the BA or the equivalent. The stipend varies but will not exceed \$2,000 for the academic year. The deadline is March 1.

For further information and applications, contact the ANS, Broadway at 155 Street, New York, NY 10032; phone 212-234-3130.

NEW YORK TIMES NOVEMBER 20, 1989

Superpowers serve as obstacles to Afghanistan peace

By Nike Kamrany and David Killion

Despite the general thaw in superpower relations, a basic disagreement regarding Afghanistan was dramatized during the recent Shevardnadze-Baker meeting in Wyoming. Each side accused the other of continuing to ship huge quantities of arms. Indeed, the situation in Afghanistan more than six months after the withdrawal of Soviet troops is violent and increasingly chaotic.

The obstacle to peace and reconstruction centers on both superpowers' stubborn insistence on trying to bring to power their clients from the 10-year proxy war.

The Soviet Union's position is that although it will agree to a "coalition government," it insists upon an unspecified role for the PDPA, the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan. U.S. policy seems to be rooted in a continued desire to impose its own Vietnam-era "Saigon" experience on the USSR. This obsession is revealed in the apparent American policy priority of having the PDPA defeated in the city of Kabul by the Mujahedeen.

Both superpowers must step back from their emotional long-term involvements in Afghanistan and assess the strength and legitimacy of their clients.

The Soviet-supported PDPA has failed to win the support of Afghans after 10 years of massive Soviet economic and military aid and intervention. The Afghan people have been alienated from the regime as a result of its large-scale repressive measures, including executions and the imprisonment of thousands for alleged political crimes. The Afghan "Marxists" and the PDPA members have always been seen by Afghans as agents of the Soviets. It is less than likely that they will be accepted as leaders by the Afghan population.

The U.S.-supported Mujahedeen leadership structure and its government in exile, Afghanistan Interim Government, AIG, is in many respects an artificial creation of Pakistani intelligence forces. It is not in a position to represent a broad majority of Afghans in the future. The seven groups of the Mujahedeen and their leaders were established by Pakistan as competitors for the military aid it was channeling from the U.S. The Afghan population, traditionally suspicious of outsiders with close ties to meddling regional or global actors, will not accept the fundamentalist-dominated exile government as a reconciliation force to rebuild Afghanistan.

Without the single goal of defeating the Red Army as a unifying force, the seven-group configuration of the AIG has quickly come apart. Recent killings and numerous military confrontations between the Rubani and the Hekmatyar factions demonstrate the extent to which cohesion has eroded.

As it has become increasingly clear to the U.S. and Soviet leaderships that their clients have significant legitimacy and credibility problems, they have begun to compete with each other in a campaign to enlist the former Afghan king, Mohammed Zahir Shah, as a means to rescue the leadership claims of the groups each is backing. For quite some time the Soviets and the Najibullah regime have desperately wanted to fly the king from his exile in Rome to Kabul, where they hoped he would rally support for a coalition government in which the PDPA would be dominant. The king has rejected Soviet overtures.

Recently the U.S., in a reversal of policy, also started making contacts with Zahir Shah. The idea is to bring the king to Pakistan, where U.S. officials believe he can bring legitimacy to the Mujahedeen's government in exile. Unfortunately for the U.S., however, the vocal and well-armed fundamentalist faction of the Mujahedeen leadership feels threatened by the king, and is violently opposed to him.

What both superpowers have recognized is that the former king is one of the few Afghan political leaders who commands respect in the broad Afghan political universe. His unique political assets include the memory of his 40-year reign, his ancestry and the fact that he has always maintained neutrality among competing regional and global powers seeking influence in Afghanistan. If he allowed himself to be



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delivered to rescue either the PDPA or the Mujahedeen, he would undermine his position in Afghanistan.

Neither the PDPA nor the AIG has the strength, cohesion and widespread appeal necessary to rule a broad coalition government of national reconstruction in Afghanistan. Without the support of the superpowers, the bankruptcy of these groups' leadership claims would quickly be exposed and Afghanistan's future could more easily be determined by democratic means.

With the backing of both superpowers, a neutral interim government could be negotiated under the leadership of Zahir Shah and/or under United Nations supervision. This interim government could repatriate refugees and work out the logistics of convening the Afghan national coalition, the *jirya jirga*, following which a stable constitutional democracy could be established. Such a strong representative government in Afghanistan would serve the mutual interests of the superpowers by enhancing regional and global stability and by lowering the costs of involvement in yet one more area of regional conflict.

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Chicago Tribune Friday, November 10, 1989

"The policy has become an embarrassment," says Charles William Maynes, editor of Foreign Policy magazine. "The Administration is riding a dead horse that has fallen to the ground and it's still beating it and can't figure out why it won't get up."

No one feels the shift in Washington's political consciousness more acutely than Sibtangulah Mojadedi, the president of the self-described Afghan rebel government-in-exile. Spending a few days in the United States reminding people that Moscow continues to bankroll, arm and fight for a government that has proven its staying power, he came knocking on the door of the White House like an unwanted guest.

Granted, President Bush and his senior advisers, including the national security adviser, Brent Scowcroft, and Secretary of State James A. Baker 3d, had a 30-minute visit with the Afghan rebel leader. But the terse, two-paragraph statement issued by the White House afterward revealed little enthusiasm for the reminder that while times have changed, Afghanistan has not.

Afghanistan Frozen Out In a Superpower Thaw

By ELAINE SCOLINO

Special to The New York Times



WASHINGTON, Nov. 28 — The Afghan rebels were a lot more popular in Washington

when they were winners. There's was a classic geopolitical battle: bearded, turbaned "freedom fighters" with their divine mission and American-made weapons against the well-trained, heavily armed Red Army.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 was a moment of crisis for President Carter, and a driving force of the Reagan doctrine

against Communist expansion. And as the last Soviet troops withdrew early this year, President Bush promised that the United States would play a "catalytic" role in bringing stability to Afghanistan.

But in the salons and meeting rooms of Washington today, talk of tensions between East and West is no longer fashionable. In the midst of breathtaking changes in Eastern Europe, discussions of enduring superpower rivalry on the battlefields of a far away place like Afghanistan are clearly demode.

"If it took ten years to get the Soviets out of Afghanistan, we shouldn't lose patience after ten months," said a senior Administration official who once predicted a quick overthrow of the regime. But, the official said, "reflecting on the situation, we do find ourselves in a difficult situation."

NYT 11/29

Afghanistan: No solution in sight

Conventional wisdom has crumbled in the face of hard realities in Afghanistan. At the time of the Soviet troop withdrawal in February, U.S. policymakers predicted that the Communist regime in Kabul would speedily collapse, perhaps even before the Soviets were entirely gone, and that the Resistance would sweep triumphantly into Kabul. Now they are trying to explain why none of this happened, and searching for some way to redeem the situation.

A variety of explanations are offered for the failure of these expectations but, in sum, they ran up against hard facts.

The Soviets said they would do everything necessary to support the Kabul regime. The U.S. apparently didn't think that they meant it—but they did. U.S. military aid to the Resistance was radically reduced as soon as the Soviet pullout began in May 1988, and was virtually cut off in February 1989 when the Soviets declared their withdrawal complete. Some administration aides insist that aid continued to flow indirectly; Congressional sources and Resistance leaders say that's not true, and that they were left with nothing to fight with.

Meanwhile, since February Soviet arms and equipment have poured into Kabul at the rate of \$200-\$300 million per month, doubling or tripling the \$1 billion worth of military facilities and supplies the Soviets acknowledged leaving behind for the regime. What Deputy Foreign Minister Vorontsov described as "new peaceful long-range weapons" have been introduced. By June, Kabul's forces had been beefed up with 800 or more SCUD missiles, an entire tank brigade with 120 T-72M tanks, over 40 BMP state of the art infantry fighting vehicles, an artillery battalion equipped with more than 30 self-propelled guns and rocket launchers, another 100 tanks and other goodies. By late September, the Soviets had added FROG-7B missiles, the bomber version of the An-12, MiG-23BN high altitude attack aircraft, MiG-29s (which can outfly Pakistan's American-built F-16s) and Sukhoi SU-27s (which can outfly MiG-29s, and which have never before been given to any country outside the Soviet Union), while an entire new Reinforced Motorized Rifle Brigade with another 200 tracked (plus 100 wheeled) vehicles and 1000 trucks had arrived in the Kandahar area.

At least the ground units were manned by effective Afghan troops; Moscow has rebuilt the Afghan army

with complete units trained and indoctrinated for years in the Soviet Union and 30-40,000 of them have now been returned to Afghanistan to fight for the regime. (It is not known who is flying the planes, but no non-Soviet pilots are known to have been trained for the SU-27s.) In addition to the army, the regime has paramilitary forces of more than 100,000, including tribal militias and the 35,000 troops of KhAD, the Soviet-directed Afghan KGB. India has been aiding the Kabul regime since 1981, and in 1987 agreed to replace some withdrawn Soviet military advisers with several hundred newly-civilianized Indian military experts, many of whom live on Soviet territory and commute to work across the border. There are also reports that 30,000 or more Soviet Central Asian KGB troops secretly remain in Afghanistan, passing as Afghans.

In response to Congressional pressure, some U.S. military aid was resumed this summer but administration sources indicate that it essentially amounts to keeping the Resistance alive until some other "solution" is found. In plainer words, the administration now appears inclined to seek some kind of compromise eventuating in a coalition government of Communist as well as non-Communist elements, despite repeated indications that this is unacceptable to the Resistance and the Afghan people.

Complicating this are divisions within the Resistance, in large part created by outside interference. Iran, Pakistan, Arab elements and others have supported various groups on the basis of their acquiescence to the aid donors' agendas, fostering continued division and conflict among the parties based in


Peshawar and undermining the interim resistance government. Most divisive has been Pakistan's ten-year policy of channeling 50 percent or more of all aid to Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a fanatic Islamic radical, giving him significant power despite his lack of support among the Afghans themselves. In spite of his violently anti-Western, anti-American views, the U.S. has acquiesced to this policy—at least until recently, when, in the wake of his follower's murder of thirty commanders belonging to a rival party, many in Congress have begun to demand a change.

Recently, U.S. officials have begun to consider the possibility of a solution involving Zahir Shah, the former Afghan king, who now lives in Rome; he is still widely popular among the Afghan people. A U.S. diplomat recently met with him for the first time in several years (although the Soviets have repeatedly approached him) and Pakistan may perform have modified its intransigent opposition to his involvement. Thus far, however, he has been extremely cautious. He has repeatedly stated his willingness as a patriot to help his people, but has ruled out participating in a coalition with the Communists, especially Najibullah; he has also expressed distaste for the extreme Islamic radical element in the Resistance, who lack a popular base. If Zahir is to return, it would probably not be as a ruler but rather as a unifying figure heading an interim government until free elections could be held.

Much of course depends on the Soviets, who continue to consolidate their political, economic and social control of Afghanistan. Najibullah has said both that he will not step down and that he would do so for "peace and

In sum, the consequences of false assumptions about Soviet intentions have come up against the realities of Soviet actions. What will happen next, and in the long run remains uncertain, but a lot of embarrassing questions will most certainly continue to haunt the issue.

reconciliation." If Moscow tells him to go, he will probably go—and in view of the international emphasis put on Najibullah as an individual, Moscow might try to gain acceptance for a successor regime by substituting someone less publicly repugnant while keeping its control undiminished.



Afghan Resistance: an uncertain future?

Freedom Monitor

OCTOBER/NOVEMBER 1989

FIGHTING TO THE LAST AFGHAN

There is no shortage of Afghans who could form a popular government – if only the outsiders would get out of the way.

BY SELIG S. HARRISON

THE COMPLETION OF THE SOVIET withdrawal from Afghanistan in February set the stage for a new and bloodier phase of the civil war that led to the invasion a decade ago. After six months of inconclusive fighting, however, the Afghan adversaries and their superpower mentors are cautiously edging toward negotiations on a political compromise.

Moscow is eager for a settlement. Mikhail Gorbachev recognizes the limitations of the Afghan Communist Party and wants to escape from the futile commitment made by his predecessors. This was unambiguously spelled out to me in a series of high-level meetings with officials of the Foreign Ministry, the Defence Ministry and the Communist Party Central Committee during a recent three-week visit to Moscow.

To be sure, the Kabul Communist regime has displayed much greater motivation, discipline and staying power than most observers anticipated. But Soviet leaders – and Afghan President Najibullah – are keenly aware that the regime could not survive on its own without the continuous airlifts and supply convoys provided by Moscow.

In my view, Gorbachev is prepared to support a peaceful transfer of power in Afghanistan in which President Najibullah's regime would step down coincident with the conclusion of negotiations to establish a broad-based transitional government. Moscow's minimum conditions for such a political settlement are that the Communists not be excluded from the process of establishing a transitional regime; that the process be conducted under independent auspices, free from the control of Pakistani and American intelligence agencies; and that the Communist Party be recognized as a legitimate participant in any future elections to be conducted by a transitional government. Representation of the Communist Party, as such, in a transitional government is an expendable bargaining demand.

While giving up its effort to ensure Communist dominance, in short, Moscow wants to be able to say that it has preserved an opportunity for the Communists to compete in the power struggles ahead. Indeed, it is important to recognize that the Geneva accords were acceptable to the Soviet Union as a face-saving compromise precisely because they did not require Moscow to abandon its Afghan clients.

THE BASIC DILEMMA NOW CONFRONTING Moscow and Washington alike is that neither the Kabul regime nor the Peshawar government-in-exile established by Pakistan and the United States, represents the majority of Afghans. Neither can serve as the nucleus of a broad-based transitional regime because both have alienated the Afghan nationalist majority. The Afghan Communist Party has been indelibly tainted by its collaboration with a foreign occupation force. But the Pakistan-based government-in-exile is also widely rejected as

the creation of Islamabad's Directorate of Inter-services Intelligence (ISI).

The ISI played a conspicuous, heavy-handed role in arranging and manipulating the Islamabad *shura*, or council, that set up the exile government in February, 1989. Protégés of the late President Zia Ul-Haq are still in control of the ISI despite Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto's continuing efforts to tame the powerful military intelligence organization. Zia had made no secret of his desire to install a Pakistani satellite regime in Kabul dominated by Islamic fundamentalist Afghan splinter groups that have been artificially built up with Pakistani support. Despite the installation of a moderate, Sibghatullah Mojadidi, as its figure-head president, the narrowly-based exile government is firmly controlled by fundamentalist factions, and has thus been discredited from the start in the eyes of most Afghans.

In order to understand the political isolation of the government-in-exile, it is necessary to recognize the nature of Islam in Afghanistan, where the established clergy has long been identified with the Hanafi school of Islamic law and various Sufi sects. The power of the local mullah in traditional Afghan society has been reinforced by a symbiotic relationship with chieftains of the Pushtun tribes, Afghanistan's dominant ethnic group. By contrast, the fundamentalist groups, preaching more purist Islamic doctrines, are seeking to destroy the Pushtun tribal system as incompatible with their concept of a centralized Islamic state linked to a pan-Islamic revival. They oppose most of the modernization measures initiated by previous regimes, especially those liberalizing the status of women.

Numbering at most 1,100 in the early 1970s, the Afghan fundamentalists faced severe repression under former King Zahir Shah, a Pushtun, and his successor, Mohammed Daud. In 1975, most of them fled to Pakistan. There they linked up with the Intelligence Directorate, staging raids against the Daud regime then at odds with Pakistan. This link made them Pakistan's favoured Afghan protégés after the 1978 Communist takeover. Nurtured by massive aid from the US as well as by fundamentalists in the Middle East and Pakistan, the fundamentalist factions have grown to number some 15,000 hard-core activists.

FOR MANY AFGHANS, ZAHIR SHAH SYMBOLIZES a period of relative stability when Afghanistan enjoyed friendly relations with the Soviet Union. But fundamentalist leaders, remembering the former king's repression, bitterly oppose any role for him in organizing or leading a new regime. Pakistan has actively obstructed efforts by Zahir Shah's supporters to organize broad-based negotiations among Afghan factions that would pave the way for the peaceful replacement of the Communist regime. Instead, Pakistan has treated the seven-party resistance alliance as the sole voice of non-Communist Afghans.

The roots of Pakistan's hostility go back to the early nineteenth century, when the original

Afghan state created in 1747 by the Pushtun tribes under Ahmad Shah Durrani embraced the Pushtun areas of what is now northwest Pakistan. Later, as part of the "Great Game," the British Raj annexed 40,000 square miles of Afghan territory between the Indus River and the Khyber Pass. They then proceeded to hand over their ill-gotten territorial gains and half the Pushtun population to the new Pakistani government in 1947. By dividing the Pushtuns, the British bequeathed an issue that has pre-occupied Pushtun-dominated Afghan regimes ever since and has poisoned the relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Zia channelled the lion's share of American weapons aid to the fundamentalists, consciously downgrading Pushtun resistance groups. Since becoming Prime Minister, Benazir Bhutto has attempted to reverse his anti-Pushtun policy, calling for a broad-based Afghan government dominated neither by the Communists nor the fundamentalists. Pakistan's interests require such a government, she told me in June 1988, since "continued civil war means the continued presence of three million refugees." In a subsequent interview with *The Nation* of Lahore, she warned more explicitly that efforts to establish a Pakistani satellite state in Kabul might stir up a Pushtun backlash.

When Bhutto visited Washington in June, she urged the US to pursue a political solution of the Afghan war through negotiations with the Soviet Union. The Bush administration stalled for time, arguing that the resistance should be given another chance to overthrow Kabul militarily this summer and fall. But administration officials express increasing impatience with the poor military performance of the resistance and the inability of the government-in-exile to broaden its base. If the Kabul regime is still intact by the end of the fighting season in October, these officials foresee an intensified search for a political solution.

WHAT EXPLAINS THE STAYING POWER OF THE Communist forces demonstrated in the Jalalabad fighting? To be sure, the Kabul regime has airpower, while the resistance forces do not. Another military factor responsible for the poor showing of the resistance forces in the Jalalabad assault so far has been their lack of experience in conventional warfare. But an important and often overlooked part of the answer lies in the fact that the Communist Party has a hard core of forty thousand highly-motivated activists who see themselves as nationalists and modernizers carrying forward the abortive reform effort launched by King Amanullah from 1919 to 1929. On a visit to Kabul in 1984 and in continuing contacts with Communist leaders, I have been reminded that dedication and a patriotic self-image are not a monopoly of the resistance fighters.

The taint of Pakistani sponsorship now attaching to the Peshawar exile regime has reinforced this patriotic self-image and enabled the Communists to rationalize their own record of a decade of collaboration with Soviet occupation forces. Many party activists are drawn from previously-submerged social groups, including women. They will not easily give up their new status and are likely to continue to fight rather than abandon the field to the resistance.

Conceivably, with a large-scale expansion of Pakistani technical and logistical support now being provided, the resistance forces would be able to use armored vehicles and improve their showing. However, the deep-seated divisions



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in the resistance would make a definitive victory unlikely in the absence of years of training in conventional warfare and a massive escalation of American military aid extending not only to armored vehicles but also to aircraft. More important, even in the event that the Communists are dislodged from Kabul, they would not necessarily stop fighting. Afghanistan would in all probability remain locked in a continuing civil war involving the Communists; Islamic fundamentalist factions backed by Pakistan, the United States and Saudi Arabia; Shia groups backed by Iran; and many of the resistance field commanders, especially those linked to the Pushtun groups who look to Zahir Shah as their spokesman.

Among the possible topics of Soviet-American discussions on Afghanistan is an agreement to terminate military aid to the Afghan combatants. Originally proposed by the United States in March, 1988, "negative symmetry" was rejected at that time by Moscow. Since Gorbachev's reversal of the Soviet position in November 1988, however, it is Washington that has rejected the concept.

If an aid cutoff could be agreed upon, the Afghan combatants would be compelled, for the first time, to focus seriously on possible political compromises. Secretary General Pérez de Cuellar would then have an opportunity to pursue the 3 November 1988, General Assembly resolution calling on him to promote a broad-based government embracing "all segments" of the Afghan people.

One of Zahir Shah's close advisers, Sultan M. Ghazi, has urged the Secretary General to convene a series of national unity conferences, or mini-shuras as a prelude to a larger shura.



Neither Kabul nor the Peshawar government-in-exile would be represented as such. However, the invitation list would be designed to provide for representation of all significant political and social forces. The mini-shuras could choose an interim government directly, composed of independent, non-partisan figures, as proposed by former UN mediator Diego Cordovez in July 1988, or they could call a larger gathering for this purpose.

CONTRARY TO THE WIDESPREAD IMAGE of a hopelessly polarized society, there is no shortage of respected, centrist Afghans who could form a government capable of commanding popular support. Former Deputy Prime Minister

Abdul Samad Hamed, former Justice Minister Abdul Sitar Sirat, former Agriculture Minister Abdul Wakil and former Deputy Prime Minister Ali Ahmad Popal are examples of the many experienced Afghan leaders who are not tainted by fundamentalist extremism, past links with the Communists, or the corruption charges that have discredited most of the alliance leaders.

While the Communist Party cannot be wished away in a postwar Afghanistan, it clearly cannot have a significant role in an interim regime and is not likely to win major representation in any future elections. Just as the US should not seek to exclude all Communist participation in the process leading to an interim regime, so the Soviet Union should be prepared to support representative processes that would, by their nature, consign the Communists to clear minority status.

Many Bush administration officials are skeptical of all formulas for replacing the Communist regime peacefully. Such scenarios, it is argued, implicitly assume that the existing Kabul governmental infrastructure would be left in place, at least initially. In this view, the armed forces, police and intelligence services of the Communist regime must be militarily destroyed and uprooted or they will subvert any new government. It is necessary to "start from scratch," as President Reagan put it in a press conference in November 1988.

The task of reshaping the armed forces, police and intelligence services inherited from the Najibullah regime would clearly not be an easy one. But the leadership of a successor regime would be fortified by its control of Western, UN and Soviet aid resources. Communist

discipline is not likely to survive for long within the security services in the midst of the political realignments that would accompany a broad-based regime. As the memory of the Soviet occupation fades, Afghan nationalism is likely to reassert itself, gradually diluting and domesticating Afghan Communism.

In my view, a policy designed to start from scratch in Afghanistan carries unacceptable moral as well as political costs. Such a policy is, in effect, a policy of fighting to the last Afghan, in the misguided pursuit of perceived American geopolitical objectives that can be achieved more effectively through political and diplomatic means.

Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security

PEACE & SECURITY
AUTUMN 1989

■ SOVIET pilots flying Ilyushin Il 76 and Antonov An 24 transport aircraft into Kabul earn as much money in a day as their counterparts in the Soviet Union earn on average in a month, sources in Kabul said.

The pilots, who fly between southern Dushanbe in the Soviet Union and the Afghan capital, earn 300 rubles (HK\$374) per flight, with two return flights a day, 15 days a month, the sources said. SCMP 10/27

Pakistan is seething with controversy about Afghanistan as the stalemate between Kabul and the guerrillas deepens. Gen. Aslam Beg, the army chief of staff, briefing Pakistani journalists recently, differed openly with official policy by advocating direct talks between Pakistan-based guerrilla groups and the ruling People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). His statements reflect the unhappiness about intensifying divisions in guerrilla ranks.

Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, who is fighting a battle for political survival, has decided not to spend much of her limited political capital on the Afghan issue. By naming Kalu to replace the late President Zia Ul-Haq's intelligence chief, she had hoped to restrain the directorate's one-sided support for Islamic fundamentalist guerrilla groups at the expense of tribally based elements. But the former intelligence chief's key deputies are still in place, running Pakistan's Afghan policy with the backing of President Ghulam Ishaq Khan.

Bhutto's only significant policy stand has been to keep the door open for peace initiatives by refusing to extend formal diplomatic recognition to the Afghan Interim Government (AIG) set up in Islamabad by the intelligence directorate in February.

What the UN hopes to establish is a "structured Afghan delegation" that would embrace influential Afghan leaders who have shunned the AIG as a Pakistani tool — notably guerrilla field commanders, tribal elders, Shia spokesmen and prominent exiled supporters of former King Zahir Shah. While AIG elements would be invited to participate, they would not be assured a dominant position. The premise of the UN plan is that the AIG does not represent the majority of non-Communist Afghans.

Some attribute Kabul's survival to its armor, the hiatus in U.S. aid and the slaughter of Communist defectors by fundamentalist guerrillas. However, the Afghan Communist Party has a hard core of some 40,000 highly motivated activists, who see themselves as nationalists carrying forward the abortive reform effort launched by King Amanullah in the 1920s. American policymakers should recognize that dedication and a patriotic self-image are not a monopoly of the guerrillas.

The taint of Pakistani sponsorship now attaching to the AIG has reinforced this patriotic self-image and has enabled the Communists to rationalize their own record of collaboration with Soviet forces. Moreover, many activists are drawn from previously submerged social groups and are likely to fight on.

Gen. Nasrullah Babar, a Bhutto's adviser, jibes at U.S. officials for underestimating Najibullah.

In an oblique reference to the American ambassador in Islamabad, Robert Oakley, who served in Saigon during its last years, Babar said: "There are some Americans who saw people hanging from the skids in Vietnam, and they just take it for granted they will see the same thing here."

NEWSDAY, MONDAY, DECEMBER 11, 1989

What Went Wrong in Afghanistan

By Robert D. Kaplan

A year ago, the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan, exuded an aura of breezy confidence.

One diplomat expected that Afghanistan's second-largest city, Kandahar, would fall by the end of 1988. A second diplomat thought that the experts were wrong regarding the fate of Afghanistan's capital, Kabul: He figured Kabul might collapse before, not after, the Soviet Union left in February 1989. A third diplomat assured me that it was illogical to expect a significant Soviet investment in Afghanistan after its troop pullout. If the Soviets could barely keep their friends in power with more than 100,000 men in uniform, what good would cheating on the peace accords and throwing more money at the problem do them?

Why was the embassy's analysis so embarrassingly wrong? The story has several facets.

The diplomats—and the U.S. intelligence community as well—were guilty of forgetting a primary lesson of Iran: Never, ever, rely on the reporting of a local intelligence agency in the Third World, where truth is a flexible concept. The U.S. had grossly overrated the stability of the shah's regime because the shah's own security force, SAVAK, had said there was nothing to worry about. In Afghanistan, official U.S. reliance on Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency was simply scandalous, considering that ISI—like SAVAK—had motives aplenty to lie and exaggerate.

ISI was an extension of the late President Zia ul-Haq's power base. President Zia was interested in throwing the Soviets out of Afghanistan in order to create a satellite state of his own, and a radical Islamic one at that. So he armed the most anti-American and fundamentalist elements of the mujahedeen, to the detriment of other Afghan resistance fighters who did far more of the fighting.

Throughout the war, media circles in Peshawar, the Pakistani rear base for the mujahedeen, were awash with stories of fundamentalist outrages against other guerrilla groups. Ambushes were frequent, weapons and money for relief work were stolen, and people were killed. Not just other guerrillas, but occasionally Westerners too. A French relief worker, Thierry Niquet, and two American journalists, Lee Shapiro and Jim Lindalos, all were killed, most likely as a result of attacks launched by fundamentalists against more-moderate mujahedeen.

There were always two wars going on in Afghanistan: the first, between the Soviets and the mujahedeen, and the second, between two specific mujahedeen groups: the fundamentalist Hizb-i-Islami ("Party of Islam"), led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, and the more moderate Jamiat-i-Islami ("Islamic Society"), led by Burhanuddin Rabbani.

Mr. Hekmatyar's mujahedeen were the biggest single cause of the divisions affecting the resistance alliance. But because he was backed by ISI and because the U.S. Embassy and U.S. intelligence officers relied so heavily on ISI, the U.S. saw Mr. Hekmatyar as a charismatic, albeit "controversial," resistance leader, who was being unfairly criticized. After all, one diplomat asked, "Where was the proof that Hekmatyar had attacked other groups? Could it stand up in court?"

(Well, now it can. The Hekmatyar commander who perpetrated the massacre of a group of Jamiat commanders in northern Afghanistan early last summer has been captured and brought back to Pakistan to stand trial.)

Why should the U.S. have believed otherwise? The mujahedeen were winning, weren't they? And when the mujahedeen began to have troubles, when provincial capitals mysteriously refused to collapse before Mr. Hekmatyar's forces as planned, ISI kept reassuring the U.S. that it was only a matter of time.



Rabbani

Mr. Hekmatyar, of course, is only part of the problem. And because the media these days are much more interested in mujahedeen divisions than they were before the Soviets departed, a false impression has been created that these internal conflicts suddenly have mushroomed. Rather, they have been evolving for years. Moreover, fights between Jamiat and Mr. Hekmatyar's Hizb-i-Islami in remote alleys of northern Afghanistan do not explain why other resistance groups, isolated from both Mr. Hekmatyar and Jamiat, are faring equally badly in the southern deserts.

This brings us to the second reason U.S. officials failed to interpret events correctly.

The U.S. automatically assumed that because it had disengaged from Vietnam after being defeated, the Soviet Union would do likewise in Afghanistan. This

logic was faulty. Vietnam is half a world away from the U.S.; Afghanistan is on the Soviet border. The Soviets couldn't just walk away from Afghanistan, and they didn't. They merely continued the war by other means. If anyone is walking away from Afghanistan it is the U.S.

Despite Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze's recent pronouncement that the nine-year occupation of Afghanistan "went against general human values," and "violated the norms of proper behavior," the Soviet Union shows no signs of giving up this dubious prize. It is spending more resources on keeping President Najibullah's communist regime alive than even the most cynical political conservatives had ever feared. Since March 1989, \$200 million to \$300 million worth of weapons and other equipment have crossed the Soviet-Afghan border each month. That's \$2.4 billion to \$3.6 billion a year, or four-to-six times more than the amount of aid the U.S. was providing the mujahedeen prior to the Soviet withdrawal. After that, U.S. aid dropped off dramatically.

It should be noted that from the strategic perspective of the U.S., the mujahedeen are still winners. They control the Afghan countryside. Whether Mr. Najib survives in power, the Soviets never will be secure enough in Afghanistan to use local air bases for regular surveillance of the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean—a distinct possibility as recently as three years ago.

Conservative fears that by threats, assassinations, and putting large amounts of money in the right places the Soviets still might manage to erect a new Afghan satellite are unfounded. If anything, the Soviet Union's Moslem republics contiguous to Afghanistan are entering an era of unrest and perhaps even dissolution, as central control from Moscow diminishes.

Nobody should envy the Soviets' position in Afghanistan. They certainly have saved face, but little more. Billions of dollars annually in military aid buy them a regime that has tenuous control of urban areas only.

Given the imperial meltdown in Eastern Europe and Africa, the upsurge of unrest within their own borders, and the state of their domestic economy, the Soviet Union's military and financial exposure in Afghanistan is an anachronism. By making temporary fools of U.S. officials, the Soviets may have only prolonged their own agony for years to come.

Mr. Kaplan is author of "Soldiers of God," which is to be published in January by Houghton Mifflin.



Hekmatyar

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

NOVEMBER 8, 1989

SALAM 9 - MISSION TO KANDAHAR

The war has taken a heavy toll in Kandahar Province. Graveyards with ragged flags indicating the tombs of Mujahedeen and piles of stones for the civilian casualties can be seen everywhere. The magnitude of destruction varies from area to area but is generally higher along strategic supply routes and as one gets closer to Kandahar city. Entire villages have been wiped off the map. Many others are decaying because of abandonment. All public buildings - schools, hospitals, administrative offices - appear to have been systematically destroyed.

Although major physical infrastructures such as dams, highways and bridges are still in place, there has been no maintenance for the past ten years. Some structures have been stripped of whatever could be removed and sold: motor of flour mills, power lines and even pylons are gone. Rural roads are often in passable condition, but have suffered from lack of maintenance. Irrigation systems, both underground karezes and small canals, also require extensive repair. Trees which used to provide shade along the main highways have been systematically felled. Although major croplands are relatively intact, direct damage to orchards and irrigation systems, particularly karezes, as well as the displacement of population and abandonment have shattered the economy of the region. Bazaars have been destroyed and the reduced commercial activities that exist seem to have shifted to areas relatively unaffected by the war. Craftsmen and skilled workers have generally become refugees. Agriculture is mainly of a subsistence nature and the marketing of whatever surplus may be available is hindered by lack of transport and political barriers to the movement of commodities.

Despite the suffering and destruction, signs of resilience and recovery are distinctly perceptible. In most areas sufficient food is being produced to feed the resident population. Some surplus - fruits, raisins and cumin seed - makes its way out of the country. Most farmers have not waited for help from outside to start rebuilding the small irrigation channels which are vital to their crops. Karezes are slowly being cleaned and many other small-scale rural development projects have been initiated with assistance from NGOs. A surprising amount of reconstruction of private houses appears to be underway.

The damage to the social fabric of the areas visited is severe. A whole generation of children have been denied the basic right to education. Not one school is functioning and there are barely a handful of Madrasahs. Most teachers and educated people have fled the area. Centralized systems for immunization and disease control have understandably collapsed and only piecemeal health care services are being provided through NGO-assisted clinics.

The war is still very much present in the province. Practically all adult males and even young boys carry firearms. The countryside is strewn with Mujahedeen bases displaying a vast array of firepower. Semi-destroyed buildings such as schools are being used as ammunition dumps. The clatter of automatic firearms and the distant thud of rockets aimed at army positions around Kandahar can often be heard. The passing of a plane, even at very high altitude, immediately triggers volleys of anti-aircraft fire.

The main problems encountered were broken roads, mud, dust and sand. Fortunately one of UN vehicles was equipped with a winch which proved to be providential when several vehicles got stuck in the mud. For the last few days of the mission the heat was extreme and trying. In addition, the members of the team were plagued by mosquitoes and fleas. No significant security problems were encountered. The mission was, however, unable to visit one project because of reported incidents between local commanders. Apart from the occasional remote rumbling of artillery, the war seemed to be an altogether distant affair in most of the areas visited.



Sandy Gall is one of Britain's top international reporters. As a **Reuter** correspondent for ten years, and as a 'trouble-shooter' and newscaster for Independent Television News since 1963, he has travelled all over the world. Since 1982 he has taken a special interest in Afghanistan, and has established a voluntary agency, the **Sandy Gall Afghanistan Appeal**, which specializes in the treatment of disabled Afghan refugees. We talked to him about his work and the responsibilities of the media.

REFUGEES: *You have covered disasters and tragedies around the world. What was it about the Afghanistan situation that grabbed your imagination and commitment?*

Sandy Gall: It was the fact that nobody was reporting it that made me really interested in the early 1980s. Many journalists had been in Viet Nam, and the war there had been very widely reported for obvious reasons. Given the involvement of the other superpower in Afghanistan, it seemed odd that it wasn't being reported as thoroughly.

Of course it is easy to explain why. Viet Nam was an 'open house' for journalists, whereas it was much more difficult and dangerous for the media to report from Afghanistan. That was the origin of my interest - purely journalistic - and I went there in 1982 for the first time, really not knowing what to expect.

REFUGEES: *You must have quickly appreciated the magnitude of the refugee dimension of the story.*

Sandy Gall: Yes. You couldn't take two steps into Afghanistan without meeting refugees coming out. Between 1982 and 1984 it became a huge problem. We went through the Nangarhar Province of Afghanistan, which is on the Pakistan border, and by then it was at least 50 per cent depopulated. One immediately realized the extent of the refugee problem. I wrote a book about my journey, and the publishers suggested that I launch an appeal. I answered that journalists don't usually do that, but eventually agreed to go ahead. It was another way of showing my interest in the situation.

REFUGEES: *There are many agencies working with Afghan refugees. How did you find an area of work where your organization could do something useful that nobody else was doing?*

Sandy Gall: We discussed it and concluded that providing artificial limbs would be a very useful and clearly defined field in which we could operate. After looking at the situation more closely, we found that

Sandy Gall



we could link up with a local hospital in Peshawar, which didn't have a workshop to produce the artificial limbs there. So they welcomed it from their point of view.

On the whole, this initiative has been a success, and we have treated a lot of people, both Afghans and Pakistanis. I was in Peshawar during the Jalalabad fighting six months ago, and at the border I saw a man who had lost his leg in a mine blast. He had the most appallingly clumsy, home-made leg. It was so bad that he had to use crutches. I told him to come down to our workshop, and to everyone's surprise he was there two days later, getting measured up. Now, I believe, he's walking around. We have now raised enough money to build our own clinic in Hyattabad, just outside Peshawar, which is custom built by *Architectes sans frontieres*. Five voluntary agencies will be working in the complex. By the end of the year, we hope to have trained more than enough Afghan technicians to run the workshop at Hyattabad.

REFUGEES: *How have you raised funds?*

Sandy Gall: Originally the funds all came from private sources, but later we found that the government's Overseas Development Administration was prepared to help. UNHCR has also put quite a bit of money into Hyattabad, and has been our best supporter in the field. We hope UNHCR is going to keep on funding us. But over half of our funds still come from the public and from private trusts.

REFUGEES: *Do you hope to work inside Afghanistan?*

Sandy Gall: Yes, we want to open up a workshop there at some stage, so that the Afghans who we have trained can work in their own country. We are looking at the possibility of establishing a project in Lowghar province, although the time is not quite right. As long as there is fighting it will be very difficult.

I Risked Death to Escape to America — Then Won a \$4.4 Million Lottery

By JOHN BLOSSER

"I risked my life to win my freedom from war-ravaged Afghanistan — then I won more than \$4 million in America, the wonderful land where dreams come true!"

Mohammad Zahir bubbled with joy as he revealed how his life was transformed when he and his family made a daring escape from their native country and found a new home in the U.S. — where to his shock he recently hit the jackpot in Florida's lottery.

"Now I'm worth more than the entire neighborhood where I lived in Afghanistan!" the 51-year-old immigrant excitedly told THE ENQUIRER.

"I thought I was very lucky when I once won a prize of five cans of vegetable oil, 150 pounds of rice and some fabric in Afghanistan's national lottery. Those were things we were happy to get. Now we can have nearly anything we want!"

"But to get to this heaven on earth called America, my family and I had to go through hell."

"My wife, our four children and I risked our lives to travel nearly 500 miles across battle-scarred land in jeeps, on the backs of camels and finally on foot. Through all the hardships, a single goal kept me from giving up: I was taking my family to freedom."

"At one point, only a few miles from the Afghanistan border, my exhausted wife fell face-down on the side of a treacherous mountain and cried in a dry, raspy voice: 'Let me die here — I can't go any farther.'"

"I tried to drag her to her feet, but she wouldn't budge. I pleaded with her, but that didn't work either."

"Blood was flowing from a gash a sharp rock had made in her cheek. Her eyes were so sad I wanted to comfort her. But I couldn't go easy on her. I had to be tough — for all of us."

"So as a last resort I taunted her. In a bitter voice I said: 'I always knew women were weak. You're not good enough to go to America. Stay here and die.'"

"I turned away and began climbing again, but my heart was heavy as I thought, 'I'll take a few more steps. If she doesn't move, I'll go back and drag her if I have to.'"

"Then I heard the sweetest sound of my life — the rustling of stones as she got to her feet and followed me."

The family's dramatic escape in June 1982 took three terror-filled days. Zahir said he'd been planning it for months — ever since learning the Russians who'd invaded Afghanistan were intending to send two of his children to the Soviet Union to be educated.

"I wasn't about to let those Communists brainwash people I loved," he said.

"I knew that by fleeing we were risking execution. People were shot in cold blood every day for trying to escape. But even death was better than living under the Russians."

"We left our home in Kabul one dark June night and rode in silent terror on a bus to a relative's home in the country, knowing that without travel papers we'd be killed instantly if Russian or Afghan troops stopped us."

"We had already paid smugglers \$384 to help us escape and the one who came to my wife's door the next night to get us was the most vicious-looking bandit I'd ever seen."

"It's time," he hissed when I opened the door.

"I hurried my family into the man's overloaded jeep and we rode all night with our lights out as part of a small caravan of refugees who were also crossing the rocky desert plain toward the mountains that made up the border with Pakistan."

"I prayed: 'God, please don't let us drive into a Russian ambush. Give me a chance to find a better life for my family.'"

"When daylight arrived, we hid under trees so Russian helicopters wouldn't spot us and open fire with their deadly rockets. The next night, we drove into foothills, where we heard gunfire and saw the flashes from explosions, while Russians battled freedom fighters."

"Later, we left the jeeps and were met by guides with camels. I had never ridden one of these 'ships of the desert' before and as the animals carried us over foothills, I felt so seasick I wanted to die."

"When the terrain became too steep for the camels, we climbed on foot for the next day and a half. Sometimes the slopes were so steep we had to pull ourselves over jagged rocks on our stomachs. The rocks ripped our clothes and dug into our hands and knees until they were bloody and bruised."

"Finally, all our struggles paid off when we crossed the border into Pakistan. 'We're free!' I shouted as I hugged my wife and children. We all

danced in delight."

Zahir and his family spent the next nine months in Pakistan, then moved to Jacksonville, Fla., to live with a son who'd escaped in 1981.

"When we arrived in America, I felt like I was in heaven," Zahir said.

"During the next seven years, I worked 60 hours a week as a mechanic to succeed in my new country dreams. I plan to pay off some loans, start a small business and buy a house."

"But more importantly, I want to use the free time I'll have to study for my citizenship test — because I want to finally be able to call myself a citizen of the greatest country in the world!"

NATIONAL ENQUIRER

11/14



Mohammad Zahir

RECENT PUBLICATIONS

STATE, REVOLUTION, & SUPERPOWERS IN AFGHANISTAN, by Hafizullah Emadi will be available in March from Praeger Publishers. 176 pp. \$39.95. 0-275-93460-8 C3460. The book studies the process of nation-state building in Afghanistan from the end of WW II to the period of Soviet occupation in 1979.

RUSSIAN CRIMES IN AFGHANISTAN by Dr. Sher Ahmad Nasri covers Soviet penetration into Afghanistan from 1826 until 1979. The 650-page book is in Dari and costs \$25. It is available from AfghaNews, P.O. Box 264, Peshawar, Pakistan.

FOREIGN ARMED INTERFERENCE IN AFGHANISTAN is the title of a booklet published by the Press Office of the President of the ROA last August. Grizzly photographs abound.

FIGHTERS AGAINST INFIDELS by Moh'd Wali Zalmai was published this fall by the ROA Academy of Sciences. The 275-page book is in Pashtu and chronicles the 1st, 2nd & 3rd Anglo-Afghan wars. (BNA 11/14)

Bakhtar reported that a book on Afghanistan by Nawin Suri was published in India. The book is based on the author's impressions of a trip to the ROA & "his meetings with Afghan leaders & ordinary people who do not cease working for a peaceful future despite the ongoing war on the long-suffering land." (BNA 11/11)

REFUGE, Canada's Periodical on Refugees, devoted its October 1989 issue to Afghan refugees. In the issue are tributes to Louis Dupree by Anders Fange & Nazif Shahrani; "The Canadian Response to Afghanistan" by Jane Thomas; "Aid in Afghanistan: Limitations & Possibilities" by Anders Fange; "Problems & Prospects for Repatriation" by Peter Rees; & "Prospects for Afghan Women After Repatriation" by Nancy Hatch Dupree. The publication is available from the Centre for Refugee Studies, York Univ., Administrative Studies Bldg, 4700 Keele St., North York, Ontario, Canada M3J 1P3. Subscription rates for the quarterly are \$20 in Canada & US\$25 overseas.

Radek Sikorski wrote "Afghansitzkrieg" in the NATIONAL REVIEW of April 21, & "Still-Life by Shellfire" in the April 7 issue.

"No Peace for Peshawar" by Edward Girardet appeared in the June issue of the CSM MONTHLY.

Bill McCollum wrote "He's a Rebel" in THE NATION, October 16; An article "It Must Be the Poppies" appeared in the same issue. The October 9 issue carried a story on the "Stalemate at Jalalabad."

Publication #15 of the Afghan Jihad Works Translation Centre in Peshawar is AF-GHANISTAN: SOVIET OCCUPATION & WITHDRAWAL, originally published by the US Dept. of State.

Part I of an INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF SCHOLARS ENGAGED IN AFGHAN STUDIES is available from AFGHANICA, The Afghanistan Studies Newsletter, P.O. Box 273, Oxford OX1 1AQ, United Kingdom, for £3.50

Volume I of Letters from Afghanistan of Serge de Beaurecueil, CHRONIQUE D'UN TEMOIN PRIVILEGIE, "1979: la Terreur," prepared by Etienne Gille & Sylvie Heslot, has been published by CEREDAF, 6, Rue Christine, 75006 Paris, France. Father de Beaurecueil's letters from Afghanistan cover the period from 1979 - 1983. Each volume will contain the letters plus annotations, photographs & maps, appendices and a detailed chronology of the period covered. Vol. I has 130 pp.

The SOUTHEAST ASIAN AND AFGHANISTAN REVIEW, edited by Harry Hayes & Phan Thanh Huy, is a quarterly issued by the South-east Asian & Afghanistan Int'l Action Committee, Case Postale 265, CH-1217 Meyrin 1, Geneva, Switzerland. The December 1989 issue (Vol 9, #17) has the following articles on Afghanistan: "Soviets Still in Afghanistan" by Harry Hayes, "Continue US Aid to Afghanistan" by Charles Wilson, "Afghanistan Human Rights Situation Still Serious" & "Kabul Regime Lists 11,000 Killed by Secret Police." A year's subscription is \$20.

The Agricultural Survey of Afghanistan, a division of the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan, GPO 689, Peshawar, Pakistan, has published its 3rd report: CROPS & YIELDS, Vol. 1. 102 pp.

The SECOND CONSOLIDATED REPORT of Operation Salam was issued by the Office of the UN Coordinator for Humanitarian & Economic Assistance Programs Relating to Afghanistan, Villa La Pelouse, Palais des Nations, 1211 Geneva 10, Switzerland, in October. The 166-page report describes the progress of the UN program, presents sectoral assessments & brief profiles of areas visited by UN teams. There is also a long list of new acronyms! Vol. 4 of OPERATION SALAM NEWS was issued in November & gives the Sec't Gen's report on Afghanistan, an update on Operation Salam's programs, etc.

LE GUIDE DE L'AFGHANISTAN by Bernard Dupaigne & Gilles Rossignol, Lyon, 1989. Hardback, color illus., 378 pp.

THE NATIONAL ATLAS OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN, Kabul. 63 maps illustrating physical & socio-economic geography. 1988.

ORGANIZATIONS

The 1990 AUSTRIAN RELIEF COMMITTEE (ARC) calendar is dedicated to the memory of Louis Dupree & features 19th century views of Afghanistan from his collection of slides. The calendar is \$8.00 & can be ordered from the ARC, G.P.O. Box 489, Peshawar, Pakistan, or through the FORUM. (We will fax the orders to Peshawar; we don't have the calendars on hand. Make your check payable to the Afghanistan Forum & note "ARC calendar" at the bottom).

AFGHAN COMMUNITY SERVICES held an Afghan food crafts & jumble sale on November 11 at its office at 2315 S. Grant St., Arlington, VA. ACS serves refugees in the Washington, D.C. area.

The November issue of Operation Salam News reported on a SWEDISH COMMITTEE FOR AFGHANISTAN survey:

In the Northern provinces a special survey was carried out by the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan this summer. It revealed the gravity of an outbreak of both locusts and Sunn Pest insects. During the last few years, the situation did not allow the necessary precautions against such problems to be taken with the result that hundreds of thousands of hectares of crop land are now infested, resulting in considerable losses of wheat. In Badghis Province alone an 84% yield loss was recorded due to locust infestation, affecting 22,000 of the farming population. Approximately 35,000 hectares have been affected here. It is estimated that over 30,000 families may currently be living below subsistence level.

Of the 10 provinces surveyed, Badghis, Badakhshan, Herat, Faryab and Samangan are the most severely affected. It is calculated that over 350,000 Afghans will be in need of urgent assistance over the winter. At the same time, the vulnerability of the poor will grow proportionally to the increase in prices of food commodities due to their shortage in the local markets.

A farmer in Badghis inspects wheat damaged by Sunn Pest (left) which has already dried up as compared to unaffected wheat



tion in Afghanistan that only the regime could find accurate.

You leave the false impression that the shortage of food and other essentials is solely the result of "efforts to blockade the capital by Muslim rebels, who receive much of their weapons and financing from Washington." The reality is that the Soviet Union and its client Afghan regime have the means to address the humanitarian shortages but have

ACBAR, the Peshawar-based Afghan Relief conglomerate, now has a Resource & Information Center - ARIC - directed by Nancy Dupree. ARIC was established to provide information to ACBAR member organizations & to the assistance community at large. It hopes to coordinate UN/ACBAR databases & further cooperation among agencies, libraries & special research institutes in Pakistan & elsewhere. Early in 1990, ARIC will begin issuing a bi-weekly News Bulletin giving news of events, library acquisitions & other information. ARIC, 444-T Old Bara Road, University Town, Peshawar, Pakistan, would like to be on the mailing lists of all Afghan assistance organizations.

Afghans Get Soviet Weapons, Not Food

To the Editor:
Your report on fear of famine in Kabul (news article, Dec. 6) presents a picture of the humanitarian situa-

chosen to ignore them completely. The current shortages in Kabul are nothing new. The Kabul regime has been aware of them for months. Suddenly with the onset of winter, an "impending famine" makes good press for the regime.

The Soviet Union operates an airlift to Kabul that is the largest in its military history. Yet, it has chosen to devote the overwhelming majority of the space on the planes to weapons and ammunition rather than to food-stuffs and fuel.

Information available to the United States Government indicates that the Kabul regime is receiving more than 1,000 metric tons of cargo each day by air. More than 75 percent of this cargo includes such offensive weapons as the Scud missile. The regime, however, needs approximately 700 metric tons of food each day to feed the people in the capital. Clearly the regime could meet these needs with a reordering of its priorities.

Finally, the resistance has avoided attacks on convoys carrying only food supplies. In some areas of Afghanistan such as Herat and the Panjir Valley, regional commanders have reached agreements permitting safe passage of nonlethal supplies. You report that "more than 1,500 trucks reached Kabul in a 48-hour period recently, and their cargos included about 2,000 tons of wheat and flour."

The Soviets continue to insist upon propping up a genocidal regime in Kabul with massive infusions of military aid. That is the crux of the humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan. Tragically, it is completely avoidable.

GORDON J. HUMPHREY
U.S. Senator from New Hampshire
Washington, Dec. 7, 1989

In Lyon, France, a 2-day conference of European volunteer agencies ended on 11/26. Participants agreed that humanitarian relief work in Afghanistan has become more difficult since the Soviet troop withdrawal.

BOOK REVIEWS

AFGHANISTAN: THE GREAT GAME REVISITED, edited by Rosanne Klass, New York: Freedom House, 1987. 519 pp. Appendices, Bibliographies, Glossary, Index, Maps. \$29.95.

Rosanne Klass has edited an anthology of great value for the study of Afghanistan. The title of the book derives from Rudyard Kipling's reference to Russian goals for the control of South Asia, and the establishment of a warm water port in the Indian Ocean, calling it the "Great Game."

The goal of this book is to provide "in succinct form the data necessary for a basic understanding of the Afghanistan issue, including the historical and geopolitical contexts in which it can be better understood" (p. 7). In this manner the work acts as an excellent textbook for the classroom. Nearly every one of the contributing authors has "hands-on" experience in Afghanistan and all are experts in their respective fields.

The subjects cover a wide range of topics concerning Afghanistan: long-term Soviet economic interests and policies, mineral resources and their exploitation, Afghanistan's Communist party, Afghan and Soviet global interests, cultural roots of the resistance, military operations, Sovietization and human rights.

In reviewing this work I must emphasize that this book was written prior to the Soviet military withdrawal and does not include any discussions concerning the indirect or direct negotiations for the extraction of military forces.

One of the many objectives of this book is to dispel many of the widespread myths about the "current" situation in Afghanistan. First, Afghanistan is not equivalent to Vietnam for the Soviets. Second, the Afghan rebels are not fanatical or xenophobic Muslims. Third, organizational differences between the various Afghan resistance groups are not due to tribal differences. Fourth, Afghans are not the uncivilized and primitive peoples that the press portrays. Finally, the financial cost of the war for the Soviets has been overemphasized.

There are several chapters worthy of note. In the first chapter Klass reviews the political history of Afghan-Soviet relations and policy. She criticizes scholars and the West for ignoring Afghanistan for so long: "In short, Afghanistan was regarded as a historic appendage that had outlived any significance, much as doctors regard the appendix - until it erupts with a poisonous infection" (p.6). At times Klass seems more bitter than objective about the subject, but the reader will find her ability to simplify the complex situation gratifying.

Yossef Bodansky, in "Soviet Military Involvement in Afghanistan," states that despite Western popular press reports that the Soviets are "bogged down" in their own "Vietnam" the Soviets actually appear to be delighted with their progress. Bodansky breaks down the decision-making process of the Soviets and the turning points of Soviet intervention into a chronological format. Of particular interest is his examination of the dangers of the Muslim revival in both Soviet Central Asia and Afghanistan. Military analysts should take note of the author's section on the operational approach of the Soviet military in Afghanistan; which covers deep intelligence, deep raiding and the infliction of "massive collateral damage on the civilian infrastructure" (p. 246).

In "Afghanistan and the Muslims of the USSR" Alexandre Bennigsen examines the impact of the Afghan conflict "on the Muslim population of Soviet Central Asia - and its corollary: the influence of Soviet Islam on the war" (p. 287). Bennigsen anticipates future problems the Soviets may have with their own Muslim populations.

The book is an excellent source of data with several appendices, bibliographies, maps and a glossary.

The appendices provide the reader with data on several important subject areas: treaties and international laws concerning human rights, a summary chronology of Afghan history, a "Who's Who" of parties (including party leaders, well-known commanders [living and killed in action], members of the PDPA and other DRA VIPs), and the significant Afghan political movements of the constitutional period (1963-1973), with each listing including the movement's political orientation, early leadership, and comments of significance.

Beyond the appendices the reader will discover a helpful glossary of terms, which includes a short section of Soviet military terms and acronyms. And there are many maps which show contrasts in topography, mineral resources, ethnic groups, Soviet and DRA forces, projections of Soviet regional power and Russian/Soviet expansion through Central Asia over the past 200 years.

In conclusion, this book certainly deserves attention by scholars and analysts alike. In spite of the dramatic changes in Afghanistan and the Soviet Union since the publication of this work, it still stands as an informative guide to the situation in Afghanistan. I strongly recommend this work for the collections of university libraries and as a textbook for the classroom.

Wendell L. Minnick
Brazil, Indiana

[A second, revised edition of the book is planned. Ed.]

DUST OF THE SAINTS. By Radek Sikorski.
Chatto and Windus; 274 pages; £14.95

BEFORE the Soviet withdrawal, the Afghan war was a journalist's nightmare. To get near the fighting could require days of laborious desert walking, tolerance for amoebic water and thin food, and a unique ability to survive constant helicopter attacks, bombing, landmines, and even booby-trapped food supplies conveniently left by the roadside. In "Dust of the Saints", Radek Sikorski writes that "such news as came through read like dispatches from a remote overseas outpost before the days of the telegraph."

With an eye to improving the coverage, Mr Sikorski set off in the spring of 1987 for the fabled Muslim city of Herat, in the northwest heart of Soviet-occupied Afghanistan. His book is not so much a war report as one man's account of his journey through a war zone. Fifteenth-century Herat was among the world's most civilised cities; twentieth-century Herat was the site of an anti-Soviet uprising which, in March 1979, left thousands of Afghans dead in the city and surrounding provinces. When Mr Sikorski arrived, he found the occupied city under siege by the rebels and most of its architectural monuments destroyed. Witnesses told him at first hand how they had gradually been driven from dislike of the Soviet occupiers to outright war.

The Mujaheddin's pre-modern lifestyle

actually helped them drive out a technically superior power. Their disorganisation, as Mr Sikorski points out, made it difficult for Soviet troops to plan offensives against them; despite a vast spy network, bombs always seemed to fall in the camps where the guerrillas had spent the night before. American-supplied Stinger missiles, whose arrival in Afghanistan Mr Sikorski was the first to record, helped too. With one \$60,000 portable Stinger, a rebel on horseback could destroy millions of roubles-worth of high-tech Russian aviation equipment.

Because there were so few western journalists in Afghanistan, the West was kept ignorant of the shocking destruction inflicted by the Soviet army on civilians. In this book, Mr Sikorski's photographs speak as eloquently as his words. The most notable show the effects of bombs he saw fall on one village: Afghan women and children, petrified in the dust of their own homes, sit immobilised like the corpses of Pompeii.

As a Pole, Mr Sikorski does not hide his sympathy for the Mujaheddin, whom he originally intended to join; but even he cannot explain the meaning of their factional divisions. He saw the rebels at their moment of greatest unity, during a leaders' conference in Sargah, where he found their religious fervour both understandable and familiar. "Tell any man that the faith of his ancestors, his morals and his daily customs are backward and useless, force him at

gunpoint to adopt a way of life he has been taught to despise, and finally get a foreign army to burn his village and kill his family if he resists—and the end-product should be a fanatic, in any age or country." Indeed, as in Poland, so in Afghanistan.

THE ECONOMIST DECEMBER 2 1989

AFGHAN PROVERBS

به لق لق سگ دریا
مردار نمی شود

A river is not contaminated
by having a dog drink
from it.

Meaning: One of good character is
pure despite criticism.

AfghaNews 12/15

Cinema

"The association of young cinematographers was established on May 28, 1989 with the cooperation of the DYOA. Four TV films entitled Aman-at (Trust), Niakan (ancestors), Nafarin Bar Jang (hating the war) and Gh-unchahaye Omid (Buds of hope) and feature films entitled Jawanan (the youth) which was screened in the 13th world festival of youth have been produced with the cooperation of Radio-TV Department since the establishment of this association." Said Musa Radmanish Chairman of this Association in an interview to a KT reporter.

He said that the functionalities of this association will spare no effort in fostering the talents of the youth.

On the improvement of the activities of Shaf-aq film institute he said that when Late Torayalai Shafaq died, I and other colleagues of Shafaq film pledged before his family that we will follow the instructions given by Late Torayalai Shafaq. Thirty youth are now working in this institute.

He went on to say that the workers of this institute have recently cooperated in the production of the film entitled Kaj Rah (the wrong way) directed by Jawanshir Haidari and Faqir Mohammad Nabl. The workers of this institute produced also the scenarios for two feature and two TV films. Shafaq film institute has certain problems and - I hope that the Ministry of Information and Culture, the Union of the Artists and Afghan Film Department will help the institute in tackling problems.

He added that I recently prepared a TV film on the occasion of the Aq-rab the Third (the solidarity day with the Youth). Farid Hamrah, Sayed Miran Farhad, Tuba Amir Samim, Zaman and Tahir the outstanding artists played their role in this film. The film reflects the real thoughts and aspirations of Afghan youth.

(Sultana)

11/9

Declaration of intent by national salvation society

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

الحمد لله رب العالمين والصلاة والسلام على رسوله
خاتم الانبياء والمرسلين امامجد

Dear Compatriots,

For more than a decade the fire of war and bloodshed is aflame in our beloved country, Afghanistan, and every day it is increasingly intensified. Almost everyday bombs, rockets, shells and bullets are falling on our cities and villages, mountains and deserts. The worst of it is that today Afghanistan has turned into a ground on which the destructive and lethal weapons from the aliens' arsenals are tested, demolishing our Fatherland and dragging its people to annihilation.

As a result of this destructive war many cities and villages, economic and social establishments, and historical and cultural institutions have been ruined, hundreds of thousands of our citizens including innocent children weltered in dust and blood or became wounded or disabled, several millions of our citizens fled to foreign countries, living in a miserable plight, the national economy went bankrupt, and our beloved homeland has drifted to the verge of destruction.

The main reason behind all these misfortunes is the fact that the alien powers have changed our free country into an exercise board of their policies as well as a theatre of international confrontation in order to expand their political sway and economic influence. Launching deceitful propaganda and giving fatal arms and boundless financial aids to the warring sides, they add, at every moment, fuel to the flames of war.

Afghans obviously have the right to decide their own destiny in an atmosphere void of various internal pressures and of biased external influence and interference. Barring the few, all Afghans want to lead a peaceful life, and are opposed to any state or government to be imposed on them by force or by use and threat of bayonet, cannon and tank.

At this very time, Afghans pressingly need to revive their ruined country. Men of culture, scholars, intellectuals and skilled and experienced people who have, in fact, been our national asset either sought refuge abroad or faced, in one way or another, a worse fate. The phenomenon of leaving the country still continues and to fill this gap is not an easy job. What is never recoverable is the extermination of Afghan, the Afghan-your brother and my brother. We will probably reconstruct buildings, but revival of those who eternally passed away in this long and destructive conflict is impossible until the resurrection at doomsday. We had in our country good, admirable and humane traditions which are about to vanish.

Dear Compatriots,

Look, what happened to the education of the country's children. We lost millions of teaching hours due to the destruction of schools in a country where the number of literates is very few. The rest of the children for whom educational facilities are available whether inside or outside the country, are educated under an alien system. Every opposing group, in our country regrettably, calls its opposite group "an enemy", antagonistic and irreconcilable, and considers it a target to be shot at. And the more so, the

prevailing conditions threaten the nation to ethnic and national, territorial and linguistic disintegration.

To destroy our country and kill the Afghans, the alien powers are massively supplying lethal arms to this land already devastated, where the people badly need food, clothes, medicine and shelter and, in one word, are aspiring a peaceful day of life without fear and anxiety.

Brother Compatriots,

Have you ever imagined what will be the fate of this land and of this free people? For many long years we, a number of Afghans, have looked forward to the return of the peaceful day, waiting to see the destiny of the Afghans to be decided by the Afghans themselves without foreign interference. But regrettably we witness that with the passage of time the roots of this calamity are deepening and widening, and aliens who have been greedily watching this land, the sacred legacy of our ancestors entrusted to us by the martyrs fallen along the path of God and homeland, are trying continuously to sow the seeds of corruption and fratricide in this suffered soil and irrigate it by the blood of the nation's youth. That is why we are convinced that it is a great and unforgivable sin to still wait and witness the deplorable condition of the country. Therefore, without any fear and apprehension and only based on national interests and motivation of conscience, with full freedom and without bias or inclination to any side but simply in the spirit of benevolence, in order:

- to create an atmosphere conducive for negotiation among all the parties involved and to find a solution acceptable to the people and opposing groups;
- to pave the way for declaring a ceasefire and ensuring control over its compliance;
- to preserve the country's independence, national unity and territorial integrity;
- to stop foreign interference in the affairs belonging to our people and country;
- to secure cooperation and assistance in forming a provisional national unity government including the concerned parties, and to renew the Constitution by a Loya Jirgah, genuinely representing the people;
- to cooperate in the free elections to the National Assembly and in participation of all parties;
- to contribute to the establishment of a state system based on the principles of the sacred religion of Islam, national history and culture and the exigencies of the time;
- to consolidate the policy of non-alignment and to avoid tatism in the international politics; and finally,
- to restore peace with justice in the country and to ensure the nation's pride and the rights of its citizens;

We the founding members of the National Salvation Society, relying on God, the Almighty, decided to commence our activity through our contacts with all the Afghan warring parties, political personalities and organisations, national forces inside the country, Afghan parties and groups in Pakistan, Iran and other countries, armed commanders in various areas of the country, the ex-King and his advocates in and outside Afghanistan, and Afghans living abroad urging them to find a solution to the pressing national and internal problems on the basis of negotiation, and in compliance with individual and social rights. Because in these conditions where there is no family that has not either lost a member or had a wounded, disabled or wanderer, where prices are increasingly hiked up and a big deficiency of essential commodities threaten our people, where an unprecedented inflation has subjected our national economy to bankruptcy, conditions from which our people have been severely suffering, we hold that remaining indifferent and keeping quiet is a big and unforgivable sin.

To achieve our objective, we will refer to the international community, the United Nations Organisation, the Non-Aligned Movement, Organisation of Islamic Conference, notable national and religious figures, effective and influential personalities in the neighbouring countries and national and international non-governmental organisations.

We will take to each and every humanistic individual the voice of the oppressed and offended Afghan people who demand peace and peaceful co-existence, their civil, political, social and human rights on their soil, and will thus awaken the conscience of humanity in this regard. We will cooperate with any individual or group that would proceed from these objectives. We call the Afghans, whether outside or within the country, for this benevolent cause.

Perhaps, a limited number of individuals, who make their subsistence through fires and guns, who owe their survival to the murdering of their countrymen, and who seek benefit from the war, will conspire and take a stand against us. However, since our objective is only to ensure the satisfaction of God, observance of humanism and rights of the homeland regardless of personal gains or temporary luring flashy life, we believe in the fact that anybody who takes a step along the welfare and prosperity of the people, the Almighty will guarantee his victory. In this we are guided by the following saying of Prophet Mohammad (Peace be upon Him)

انصر اخاك ظالما او مظلوما

Our stand is borne out by the fact that over the past ten years we have not even been in agreement with the current policies of the time. Similarly, we have had no collaboration with those who have been opposed and hostile to the present regime.

We do not see as permissible any cooperation with any state or super power, unless they refrain from direct and indirect intervention in the internal affairs of our country.

We urge the entire Afghans to help us materially and morally. We want the human community, whose humanistic affection and conscience are still alive, to save our nation from the verge of annihilation.

We wish all the Afghans, whose hearts beat for the love of their homeland and compatriot, to form such groups where ever they are, become united, and take their voice of righteousness ever louder to reach the human community.

Dear Compatriots,

Wherever you are, get united, join hands, forget the motives that split you, put aside previous differences in accordance with the Afgh-

an tradition, become helpers of each other and embrace one another. Your country is living through critical and crucial moments of its history. It is only by unity and oneness, tolerance and forgiveness that we can successfully and proudly get through these delicate and complicated moments of Afghan history.

وتوكل على الله وبنستعين

The statement was agreed upon and endorsed by the founding members of the National Salvation Society in their meeting of September 30, 1980.

No. Name:

1— Prof. Mohammad Asghar, former vice-president of Helmand valley development project, rector of Kabul University, Kabul city Mayor and Minister of Justice, as chairman.

2— Dr. Mohammad Aman, former president of Industrial Development Bank and Minister of Finance, as deputy chairman.

3— Ret. General Abdul Hakim Katawazi, former commander-in-chief of police force as deputy chairman.

4— Eng. Abdul Qudos Majid, former deputy minister of mines and industries, as secretary.

5— Sheikh Ali Ahmad Fakoor, a spiritual figure as secretary.

6— Mohammad Anwar Ziaie, former Minister of Finance, as member.

7— Ret. Col. Gen. Mohammad Azim, former Minister of Public Works, as member.

8— Prof. Abdul Wasai Seraj, formerly lecturer at the Law faculty of Kabul University, as member.

9— Prof. Mohammad Anwar Arghandiwal, former Minister of Justice and lecturer at Law faculty of Kabul University, as member.

10— Dr. Mohammad Akbar Omar, former Minister of Commerce, as member.

11— Abdul Hakim, former Minister of Agriculture, as member.

12— Dr. Abdullah Wahidi, former rector of Kabul University and Governor of Kabul, as member.

13— Ret. Gen. Mir Mohammad Osman, former vice president of military court, as member.

14— Lal Gul Fariad, former deputy in the National Assembly, as member.

15— Hafizullah, former president of bus enterprise, as member.

KT 10/7

Nimroz

Nimroz province after the declaration of National Reconciliation has had considerable gainings. An interview was conducted about the peace security of the province with Lt. General Ghulam Nabi Yousufi, governor and president of Defence Council of the province.

Q: There is no doubt that security and tranquillity in Nimroz province is relatively better than most of the border line provinces of the country. Please explain about the present politico-military position, victory and the results of the endeavours of the joint armed forces stationed in this province.

A. In Nimroz province the armed forces (tribal division, Tsarandoy commandant and state security) are always ready with high morale, vigilance to defend the gains of Saur Revolution, national reconciliation policy and to defend and protect decisively the life and material of people of this province.

Armed extremist positions and American servants backed by Pakistani militarists and Saudi Wahabis once in a while fire on the districts of this province from far places but it should be testified that the armed forces of this province the real defenders of be-

loved Afghanistan reply to their action, decisively, on time and defeat them severely. It has to be mentioned that the residents of this province hand in hand with the armed and security forces participate actively to defend their area.

We have strengthened our relation with Iran and developed it up to the border commissariate level and have sent our delegates to the two sides border-lines. Recently a position was taken by our military forces along the enemies supplying route in Khakack and Khospas which is stretching a distance of (150) km through Zaranj, as a result (60) km common border line between Iran and Afghanistan.

Q: I want to ask you as a governor and president of Defence Council of the border province which has common border with Iran, at a distance of 219 km.

How do you evaluate the state policy about the political and diplomatic relations and what has the leadership of Nimroz province has done to the peaceful policy of our revolutionary country in Nimroz and what achievements did you have in this sphere?

A: Due to the peaceful policy of the RA we have secured our neighbourhood relations and has achieved successes in this regard.

The common border between the two countries has helped us tremendously in transportation of foodstuff, oil and trade goods. In addition to strengthening relation between two neighbouring countries and changing the border of the two countries to peace, friendliness and fruitful cooperation, we hope further success in the future.

THE KABUL TIMES

NOVEMBER 9, 1980

Folklore of Afghanistan

As a multinational country, Afghanistan has diverse cultural features, which give fascinating colours and dimensions to Afghan folklore.

The folklore of the **Dari-speaking** population of the country, represented mostly by the Tajik nationality, is studied quite well, both from the point of view of content and pattern, it includes **Rubai, Chaharbaiti, Dubaiti, Ghazal** and others.

The folklore of the **Turkic-speaking** population has some specific peculiarities, but, on the whole, it is studied quite well, because of the vast researches conducted in the Soviet Uzbekistan and Turkmenia. And due to close contacts of the RA Academy of Sciences with their colleagues in the Soviet Union, the results of their researches have been widely popularized in Afghanistan through periodicals of the Afghanistan's Academy of Sciences.

The **Pamirs** folklore, represented by the **Sheghnan** and **Wakhnan** nationalities, is mostly recorded in the Tajik language of the USSR because they are frontier population between our two countries and thus we can state that it is studied pretty well, and is made known in Afghanistan in the same way as the Turkic folklore.

Their songs **dargilkik**, specific for the **Sheghnanis**, in a way, is close to **Pashtu Landy**.

The **Baluch** folklore is, on the whole, studied not enough. But out of what is known, we may state that the genre of epic heroic song is mostly interesting. The main heroes of many these songs is **King Chakar**. The most well-known cycles of the songs about him are **Shahadad wa Mahnyaz** and **Shah-Murad wa Ani**, the latter showing a number of negative qualities of man compared to woman.

In olden times, to all **Baluchi** festivals **shaher** (bard) was invited. **Shaher** was also considered a wise person, who only added to the popularity and spread of folk songs.

Baluch folk songs were accompanied by special music which greatly differs from music of other nationalities of Afghanistan.

The **Pashai** folklore is of great interest. It is rich, has a lot of genres — tales, songs (several genres), but is not studied enough.

The **Nooristani** folklore is rich and very interesting, the myths being of the main interest. But, unfortunately, out of the materials collected by German linguist G. Buddruss only a small part has been published, the rest is not published yet. And because of the delay of studies in this area, due to the political situation in the country, most of the folk stories and myths

have been lost for science and common knowledge. (Quite detailed information about Nooristan has been published by our magazine; see issue No 4, 1987, article entitled "The Land of Light".)

The folklore of the **Hazaras** is practically unstudied, except the attempt made by **Kateb Hazara**, one of the members of the constitutionalist movement.

At present, due to the efforts exerted by **Pashtu Tulana** (Association of the Pashtu Language and Literature), extensive studies of the **Pashtu** folklore are being conducted. Considerable help in this field is rendered to Afghan scholars by their Soviet colleagues. As to the West, there it is studied not enough. Here we are going to speak about Pashtu folklore, as one being least of all known to our foreign readers.

The first studies of historical and lyrical love songs, as well as religious and some ritual songs of the Pashtuns were prepared together with their translation into French and put out in Paris by J. Darmesteter in 1888-1890.

In Afghanistan, collection and studies of oral literature of the Pashtuns have been started since the foundation of **Pashtu Tulana** in Kabul in 1937. But even then the work was carried out by a group of enthusiasts. A collection of epic couplets was prepared by the founder of modern prose in Pashtu **Saleh Mohammad** (1888-1961). The manuscript was presented to **Shah Mahmoud Khan** (the then Minister of Defence), but the book was never published. The first edition of Pashtu folk songs was put out in Kabul in 1944. The collection which comprised over 3,000 items of folklore was composed by **Mohammad Gul Nuri** (1902-1973). The songs of this collection, like those collected by J. Darmesteter, were later included in other numerous publications on the subject prepared by **Gul Pacha Ulfat**, **Sediqualah Reshtin**, **Abdurrauf Benwa**, **Abdul Hai Habibi**, **Abdul Manon Dardmand** and others.

Out of a number of researchers of Pashtu folklore who started their work in the 1960s, such as **Abdullah Bakhtani**, **M. A. Ziyar**, **D. M. Shinwari**, **Sulaiman Laeq** and others, the works of **A. Bakhtani** (**Khedmatgar**) are worth of special mentioning. In his searches of historical songs that had still been preserved in the memory of elders or were included in the repertoire of local professional singers, he traversed on foot and by car many regions of **Nangarhar**, **Laghman**, **Kunar** provinces. As a result, he managed to save from oblivion dozens of unknown folk songs. Since 1965, he started regular publication of these songs in mass media of Kabul and **Jalalabad**. In these articles **Bakhtani** also gave information about the authors, informants — those who narrated the

songs, and their places of residence.

In 1970s, the interest in Pashtu folk poetry was on the increase among teachers and students of **Kabul University**. Quite an important event in this regard was the inauguration in 1972 of the Society of the Studies of the Folklore of the People of Afghanistan. The Society started publication of a periodical "Folklore" the same year. In the same period, articles by folklorists **Habibullah Afridai**, **Abdul Karim Patang**, **Ali Mohammad Mangal**, **Dzadran**, and **Nangyalai** were put out in scientific periodicals.

Among Afghan researchers of this period the activities of **Habibullah Rafi** and **Zalmai Hiwadwal**, graduates of **Kabul University** were most fruitful. As a result of their energetic searches, **Rafi** and **Hewadmal** found out and recorded a number of new songs, studied whole groups of different themes. The results of their researches were published in Kabul during 1970s.

This period was characterized by a qualitatively new stage which manifested itself in a new approach to the folkloric studies. In the works of **Mohammad Ibrahim Atai**, **Abdul Qayum Noorzai** and other Afghan researchers a new methodology based on the latest achievements of the studies about general laws of socio-economic and cultural development of the entire humanity has developed.

The study of the epic heritage of the Pashtuns in Pakistan was started in 1954 in Peshawar when within the framework of its university a historic-philological association was founded called **Peshawar Pashtu Academy**. A similar scientific organization was set up in 1972 in **Quetta Pashtu Academy**. The main object of their studies was the folk poetry of **Kakars** and **Marwats**, specific forms of songs, such as **Landy** and **chaharbaiti**. But the formation and development of the folkloric studies here have some specific features caused by the reason that till 1947, i.e., till the formation of an independent Pakistani state, colonial rulers of British India exerted all efforts to root out patriotic poetry of the struggling Pashtun people.

Folk poetry can be remembered by people sometimes for a very long time. There is one folk Pashtu song (in the form of couplet) which is considered to have been created over a thousand years ago. According to estimations of **Murad Shinwari**, "oral poetry lives not in books, but in hearts of people". In the illiterate society people remember these verses usually for 60-80 years. But there comes a moment when the singer who performed and thus preserved them, dies and together with him disappear the songs. Thus, the most precious part of our cultural heritage goes in oblivion."

However, not all Pashtu folk poets could find pupils, had neither time nor will for teaching them, and sometimes did not want to pass on their creations to some declamators, singers or musicians roaming around in search of new songs and verses. Sometimes this was motivated by some practical reasons, like competition, author's desire to remain the only performer of a popular song (which also brought to him quite a large financial income). In such cases, the existence of a song was restricted by the lifetime of its creator.

As to the forms of the Pashtu folk songs, the form of *chaharbaiiti* (four couplets) is the most popular one.

The emergence in Pashtu literature and not in a written tradition, but in oral literature of a large number of verses in the form of *chaharbaiiti* required from their creators great incentive, experience, skill, inspiration and talent.

Another quite popular literary pattern used by Pashtu folk poets is *Ghazal* (though it is mostly used in love and lyrical songs). The variety of *ghazal*, having more than sixteen verses, is called *qasyda*.

At different stages of social life of the Pashtuns, in their everyday life, at the moments of joy and sorrow, always and everywhere they were accompanied by special songs-couplets, perfect in their meaning, and very up-to-date. These songs are called *landy*. The most specific peculiarity of these songs is that they have always reflected the most burning issues and can spread with lightning speed. Being short, they can be easily remembered which only helps their great popularity among common people.

Speaking about the popularity of *landy* and emphasising their importance for social and cultural life of the Pashtuns, the so-called popular chronicler, Sulaiman Laeq wrote: "In times when all historical sources, characterizing Pashtuns, suddenly disappear and only *landys* are left, it would not be very difficult, based on these verses, to restore the peculiarities of Pashtuns and to describe the characteristic features of their cultural development."

Landy of the period of the military aggression of British colonialists.

Be ready, girls, with sabres to fight with them.

Landy of the period of the 2nd Anglo-Afghan War
O, people to jam the English have come, they started conspiring plots on the land of Pashtuns.

Landy about the Maiwand Battle:
Sabre in the hand, gun on the shoulder thus the beloved left to fight for the sacred cause, under Maiwand he goes.

Landy

If you do not perish as a hero in Maiwand, I swear, beloved, you would be disgraced.

Landy

I'll sacrifice myself for the homeland, to be considered as a hero of Maiwand.

Landy

About the Spinbuldak Battle:
My beloved for his country laid his life out of my curls
I'll make his shroud.

Chaharbaiiti by Shah Bogorg about Mohammad Jan Khan (a passage):
Poet Shah Bogorg makes truly verses.
(How glad I am that wonderful verses he makes!)

Here is Ghazi Mohammad Jan Khan,
If you tell nothing about him
People in all corners of the world would talk about him.

Chaharbaiiti by an unknown poet about Ghazi Mohammad Jan Khan:
Ghazi Mohammad Jan Khan has brave spirit and he is a hero.

The sacred war he waged on out skirts of Kabul.

For that the people blessed him,
Ghazi Mohammad Jan Khan became the leader of Ghazis there. O, the wise, listen to me, the one who was carefully

staying unharmed.

All together gathered Ghazis.

Gave his consent for the sacred war to be started Ghazi Mohammad Jan Khan.

Decided he to wage a war, captured a **parang**.

And, striking them down with his sabre, towards Calcutta to Hindustan went

Ghazi Mohammad Jan Khan.

Of course, in a short article it is impossible to show Pashtu folklore in all its versatility and beauty. The examples given here are just an attempt to introduce it to our foreign readers. The choice of songs is not accidental. Afghan folksongs emphasize bravery and heroism which become inalienable in every people at the time of hard trials, such as the Afghans' wars against British colonialists.

Nothing but heroic historical folk songs can show better the spirit of the people because it is the people themselves who composed them.

Zarina



Ab nadida moza az pa nakash.


*Without measuring the water don't take off your shoes.
Look before you leap, think before you speak.*

Dodz nabash az padshah natars

*Don't be a thief and you shouldn't be afraid of the king.
The honest man is as bold as lion.
(The honest man is never afraid of any accountability).*

Qasab ke besyar shod gaw mardar shod.

*Too many butchers spoil the cow.
Too many cooks spoil the broth.
(Things should be efficiently handled).*



View of book shop of

Bahaqi. KT 11/14

AFGHANISTAN
Today

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NOTES AND NEWS OF THE PEACE, NEUTRALITY
AND FRIENDSHIP ORGANIZATION
OF THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN

Afghan 'Mountain Man' May Have the Last Say

BY MARK FINEMAN

Kabul, Afghanistan

Throughout a decade of war, Suleiman Layeq has been haunted by his "man from the mountains."

Layeq, a key cabinet minister in the beleaguered government of Afghan President Najibullah, doesn't even remember the man's name.

But for Layeq, a celebrated Pushtun poet and author, the man from the mountains has come to symbolize the brutality, tragedy and increasing ambiguity of a war that continues to tear his nation apart.

For four years, Layeq has been using the man as the hero of his unfinished novel — a fictionalized account, all in rhyming verse, in his native Pushtu language — that is likely to be a most extraordinary and lyrical account of a war that already has left more than 1 million of his countrymen dead, 5 million others refugees and the battle lines more blurred than ever before.

The novel is entitled, simply, "A Man From the Mountains." And here's how the author described it during a recent interview in his modest cabinet office in Kabul:

"This novel began from reality, from this man whom I arrested while I was commissar in my home place, a mountainous province in eastern Afghanistan along the embattled Pakistani border," Layeq said, smiling at the memory.

"The soldiers brought him to me, saying he was a counterrevolutionary, a rebel fighter with the so-called Mujahedeen.

"But he was such a handsome man. He was so well-proportioned, it was as if his body had been carved from marble. His skin was a radiant, reddish brown. And his face spoke of strength and power beyond the imagination.

"So I instructed the soldiers to let him go free."

It was a rare order from one such as Suleiman Layeq. A hard-line Marxist, he was among the founding members of the pro-Moscow People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan.

So committed — and creative — was Layeq that he wrote the national anthem of the new Marxist republic when the People's Democratic Party came to power that year.

When he met his man from the mountains while serving as party chief of Afghanistan's Eastern Military Zone in 1980, just a few months after 115,000 Soviet troops marched into Afghanistan to protect the new Marxist regime, Suleiman Layeq was a man to be feared by any counterrevolutionary in his midst.

"But this man refused my pardon," Layeq continued. "I asked him, 'Don't you think that in such cases, people such as you may well lose their life?'"

"Of course," the man replied.

"Then why do you refuse my par-

don?" I asked.

"He said, 'Why do you pardon me?'"

"I told him that I did not want so handsome, so strong and so pure a man of our land to be put to death so foolishly."

"And he said, 'Thank you for your feelings. But I am also a man. I have pledged to be your enemy. If I accept your pardon, I must stop fighting you. And I do not break my pledges.'"

I was stunned. Not only did this man refuse the life I offered him, but he confessed to his crimes in the process.

"Why have you done this?" I asked him. "You did not have to confess these things to me."

"You gave me a kindness in offering your pardon," he replied. "So I return the kindness. I give you the truth, for I have nothing else to offer."

"Such a personality, I cannot forget. When I write about him, even now as I speak about him, I again come under the same spell I felt when I was facing that man."

"All at once, I saw that beneath the personality of a simple Afghan man, there lay a great hero of this land. The path he has chosen for his heroism, of course, is something else. But even then, lately, I am beginning to wonder."

"The book, after all, is not yet finished."

In Layeq's compassion and admiration for his enemy nine years ago — indeed, the sympathy and growing ambivalence he harbors for him today — there are important hints that Najibullah's own government is increasingly divided over the war and its impact on their party's once "glorious revolution."

Ever since the Soviet troop withdrawal from Afghanistan last February, the singular goal of Najibullah's regime has been survival — at any financial or ideological cost.

"It is true, there have been many changes in our country and our party lately," Layeq said sadly, frowning as he stroked the white Leninist goatee, a physical reminder of his ideological hero. "My book is changing, too."

And again, Layeq used his "man from the mountains" to explain.

"To be honest, I did not have any plan to lead the reader here or there in this novel," the 60-year-old cabinet minister said. "But I had been trying to portray the life of a hero who began as a counterrevolutionary and later changed, turned against the rebel forces and joined our party in its crusade."

"But lately, my hero is changing in other ways. His love fails. He has seen too much bloodshed and death. It pains him that the heroes of the nation, men like himself, are continuing to kill each other in the shadows of the darkness that remains over our land."



Suleiman Layeq

"And I am getting a bit philosophical now about the ways a man changes. It is my hero who is leading me. I am not leading him. Once, for example, he cried, 'I did not want him to cry. He was too strong for that. But he moved my pen, and he cried.'"

"And lately, well, I am very worried about him — that something unpleasant will happen to him."

Layeq paused. He looked down at his old, battered desk and again stroked his white goatee. His eyes were wet.

"Now, I really don't know what is going to happen to him," Layeq said slowly. "And, as I said, the story is unfinished, so there is no map for me to follow."

After a long silence, Layeq was asked just how it happened that the real man from the mountains finally did go free nine long years ago: Did he accept your pardon, after all?

"Yes, he did," Layeq replied, smiling again with admiration, "but on one condition."

"The man said, 'I will go, but you must accept my pledge that I will continue to fight you.'"

"Without a pause, I said, 'Yes, I accept your pledge. Go and continue your fight against me.'"

"And, so it seems, he has."



Pamir 38th anniversary marked

Thirty eight founding anniversary of Pamir Weekly was marked in a function held in Babur garden which was attended by writers, poets and men of culture of the country.

Pamir weekly made its debut in 1329 HS and Ahmad Mir Royan the outstanding writer of the country was the first editor-in-chief of it. As a weekly published in Kabul, Pamir has witnessed so many ups and downs: Some times it was the beloved

periodical of Kabul citizens and some times it served as a city news bulletin and newspaper.

The weekly is duty bound to introduce Kabul city and deal with the urban issues. News, editorials, articles on introducing the urban projects, city crimes, the historical background of relics, gardens and recreational parks, welcoming the Id and national jubilees introducing Kabul folklore and e.t.c. are published in this weekly

KT 11/14

CHRONOLOGY

10/16 - Bangkok Post - The ROA has invited US officials to inspect a missile base near Kabul to disprove allegations that the Soviets are secretly operating the base. (See FORUM XVII:6, pps 9,10). Diplomats in Kabul said it was highly unlikely that the US would take up such an invitation.

10/19 - BNA - In Kabul construction on the 2,080 meter Kartai-Ariana Canal project began. Costing Afs. 165m, the Canal is being built by 6 construction firms & will be completed in 2 months.

10/21 - BNA - The ROA Ministry of Repatriates & the Hillo Trust of London [Hazardous Areas Life-Support Organization - HALO - see p. 18] signed a protocol for mine-clearing services & the delivery of free medical instruments for Afghan hospitals. So far, "Hillo Trust and its allies" have given the ROA Afs. 60m worth of medical equipment.

- The ROA is building a new airport 55 kms from Kunduz City. Land owners in Kunduz can now rent any of 110 Soviet-supplied tractors & combines for Afs. 600/hour.

- The ROA & East Germany signed a protocol whereby the GDR will deliver sugar & vegetable oil to Afghan traders. An ROA delegation will attend the 1990 Leipzig Fair & the GDR will rehabilitate its trade office in Kabul.

10/22 - BNA cites the London Daily Guardian as reporting that Mawlawi Nasim Akhundzada of the Islamic Movement of Afghanistan has asked the US for \$2m in order to refrain from narcotics production. Akhundzada's farm produces 120-600 tons of opium/year & 1/5 of it is changed into heroin in the border regions of Pakistan.

- Hesamuddin Mahmoud, a Saudi, was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment for illegal entry into & armed activities against the ROA. He can appeal.

10/23 - BNA - The Water Supply & Pasture Dept. has dug 10 deep wells at a cost of Afs. 30m in Kabul, Baghlan, Balkh & Herat. Each well "could provide hygienic drinking water for over 10,000 persons."

10/25 - BNA - The PDPA CC held its first plenum since the Soviet troop withdrawal. - The Constitutional Council approved an amendment to the Law on authority & organization of ROA courts. The Council also approved Presidential Decree #1088, dated 10/14, which gave "the authority of prolongation or removing emergency state in the ROA to the ROA Nat'l Assembly."

- BNA cites a VOA report that mujahideen captured some trucks full of tribal goods on the Jalalabad-Torkham Highway. BNA says that now local tribesmen have banned opposition lorries & ambulances from the road.

10/26 - SCMP - China has cut its arms supplies to Afghan guerrillas, is slowly normalizing relations with Kabul & has begun trading with the ROA, according to Asian diplomats.

The Chinese official said: "The Soviets have withdrawn from Afghanistan. That was our main goal. We see no need to continue our support of the guerillas."

China began supplying the rebel forces soon after Moscow intervened in Afghanistan in December 1979.

Chinese assault rifles, mortars, small rockets, grenades and other light arms were the weapons of choice for many guerilla groups, although China's support never reached the level of American assistance, which is about US\$600 million (HK\$4.68 billion) a year.

Asian diplomats predicted the guerillas would continue to be supplied with Chinese arms purchased from the international arms market.

A senior Asian diplomat, whose country has good relations with Afghanistan, said his embassy believed Chinese arms supplies stopped some time this summer.

Now that China and the Soviet Union are normalizing relations, and the mainland is also improving ties with India, Beijing does not need to encourage a civil war in Afghanistan, the diplomat said.

In addition, he said, Chinese foreign policy has acquired a more cautious air since the crackdown on the democracy movement in Beijing.

The Chinese diplomat said China was selling canned goods and some light industrial products to Afghanistan. He also noted that the Afghan Government has stopped criticising China's policy towards it.

10/27 - SCMP - At the PDPA CC plenum, 2 new politburo members were appointed: Karim Misaq & Abdul Ghorbandi, both Khalqis. (See article on p. 14)

10/28 - BNA - A committee of the ROA House of Representatives discussed the draft law on "shooting & the survival of wild beasts."

- An Hazara Nationality Mobilization Centre opened in Kabul. Ahmad Ali Fakoor is chairman of the Center.

10/ 29 - NYT - A delegation from the AIG announced plans for holding an election before 2/15/90 but the details were hazy. Farooq Azam led the delegation which met with Bush Administration & UN officials to lobby for more political & military support for the mujahideen.

- Hong Kong Standard - Guerrillas shut down the Salang Highway last week. Over 1,500 supply trucks were backed up & fuel tankers had to be held at "Harytan" port. [The ROA managed to reopen the road after 9 days.]



10/30 - BNA says "Contrary to the expressions of Senator Humphrey, here is not existed a single Soviet advisor in Afghanistan, exception a limited number of experts only in Kabul who have the duty of handling & delivering technical information." Soviet Foreign Min. Shevardnadze said that Soviet assistance to the ROA would continue as morally the Soviets don't have the right to avoid sending assistance.

10/31 - BNA - Radio Afghanistan & All-India Radio signed a protocol to exchange delegations & radio programs.

11/1 - AfghaNews (Jamiat) - The guerrilla Supervisory Council of the North reported that the Soviets have sent military advisors to Kunduz & new advisors to Kabul.

- The US says that Soviet aid to the ROA is now \$400m/month - up from a previous \$300/month.

- The AIG Police Dept., commanded by Abdul Haq, began a training program on 10/23 for 200 policemen.

- BNA - The ROA signed an agreement to buy 3m polypropylene trash bags from North Korea for "\$1,148,250."

11/2 - NYT - UN Sec'y Gen'l de Cuellar wants to create a group representing all the Afghan opposition factions to begin negotiations with Kabul on the creation of a broad-based gov't. (See 11/3)

11/3 - PT - The UNGA adopted without debate a resolution calling for a comprehensive political settlement in Afghanistan & the establishment of a broad-based gov't to create conditions conducive to the voluntary return of the refugees. The resolution, worked out by the USSR & Pakistan, calls for an intra-Afghan dialogue; requests de Cuellar to "exert every effort" to achieve that objective; reaffirms the right of Afghans to determine their own form of gov't; & emphasizes the preservation of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, independence & non-aligned & Islamic character of Afghanistan as essential to a peaceful resolution.

- Asbury Park Press - The guerrillas rejected peace talks with Kabul as called for by the UNGA. Najibullah Lefrey, AIG information minister, said: "We see the resolution as the same as last year."

- News from Asia Watch - The organization, which monitors human rights violations, has issued a report expressing concern over the increasing number of violations perpetrated by the Afghan resistance.

11/4 - LAT - Mark Fineman writes that Karachi's police chief blames his mounting crime problem on "this damn Afghan war." Karachi is the key link in the weapons pipeline as well as the heroin trail, so once rural dacoits have found urban crime more profitable.



Manchester (CT) Herald 11/9

11/6 - SCMP - Lord Bethell, Vice Chmn of the European Parliament's Human Rights Committee, was in Kabul last week to discuss prisoner exchanges. The ROA released 3 guerrilla POWs last Friday & gave Bethell a list of no longer extant Afghans (see 11/9). Bethell will meet next week with Benazir Bhutto & Mojaddidi.

- PT - CIA Director William Webster told the Washington Post that the USSR provides \$300m worth of equipment to the ROA per month. Since February 1988, over 1000 Scud missiles (costing \$1m each) have been fired. Webster said the ROA army had been reduced from 150,000 to 120,000 troops by death & desertion.

- BNA - Lt. Gen. Ali Akbar, killed at Kandahar, was buried yesterday. Mourning rites for Haji Kandahari, a senator from Paktia [cause of death not given], were also held yesterday. (See 11/7)

- Operation Salam, the UN project in Afghanistan will require 5 years and \$1,166m. (See 11/21)

- Since 1/15/87, over 227,300 Afghan refugees have returned to Afghanistan. Most of the returnees are from Farah, Herat, Nangarhar, Nimroz, Kandahar, Baghlan, Balkh, Logar, Paktia & Kabul Provs.

11/7 - NYT - During the guerrilla attack on Kandahar, in which Gen. Ali Akbar died, ROA generals Halim & Shamshuddin were wounded.

- PT - John Tarzwell, a Canadian working for a relief agency in Peshawar, has been missing since 11/1.



- Kabul has threatened to ask the USSR for more weapons if the war intensifies in Afghanistan. Reportedly Moscow will give the Afghans MiG-29s & an advanced version of the Sukhoi fighter within 6 months.

11/9 - NYT - The ROA gave Lord Bethell (see 11/6) a list which named 11,000 political prisoners killed by Khad during the 1st 20 months of the Saur Revolution. Included on the list were former Afghan prime ministers Noor Ahmad Etimadi & Moh'd Musa Shafiq. Not included were the names of any of those killed while Najibullah was head of Khad.

- BNA - The ROA sports committee has received \$50,000 from foreign sources in the last 6 months.

- Soviet-Afghan cooperation is based on over 200 agreements & protocols.

11/13 - BNA cites VOA as saying that Sayyaf rejected the idea of Afghans now living in Europe participating in a future Afghan gov't., & that Yunis Khalis rejected the participation of many Sh'ite groups living in Iran. Khalis called the UN proposal to expand the interim gov't "impracticable." (See 11/15)



11/13 - BNA - A jirgah of free tribes met in North Waziristan on 11/2 to oppose continuation of the war in Afghanistan.

11/14 - BNA - 30% of Afghan women & girls are now employed in state & private institutions of the ROA.

- The Ahoe shoe factory makes 400,000 pairs of shoes annually; production is up 23.71% over last year. Ahoe employs 346 workers & has 85 retail outlets.. 49% of the shares of Ahoe shoe belong to "Dr. Pagani, a Swedish national."


- Kabul Felez makes Afs. 150m worth of furniture/year & is "elevating steadily the quality of its production. Kabul Felez products enjoy special privileges - firmness, beauty & low price..." 80% of the raw material for the factory is imported.

11/15 - AfghaNews - Yunis Khalis says that because of the war, conditions are not suitable for holding elections in Afghanistan. Gulbuddin & Gailani favor elections "for a council to endorse the interim gov't." Other parties argue that it is still impractical but that work on holding elections should continue.

- US special envoy to the resistance, Peter Tomsen, made his 3rd trip to Pakistan to meet with resistance leaders.

11/16 - BNA - The ROA proclaimed the law on privileges of the opposition field commanders. At the October party plenum Najibullah reported on the diversity of opinion "of the oppositions" & their tendency "towards the termination of war." He called for procedures to maintain contact with & to supply goods to opposition commanders as well as for the rehabilitation of schools & conducting other "social activities in localities." [Whether the law does this was not made clear.]

11/17 - NYT - A guerrilla munitions dump at Garam Chasma exploded killing at least 40. The depot belonged to Jamiat & the disaster may have upset guerrilla plans for a stepped-up offensive in northeastern Afghanistan. The cause of the blast was not known.



- BNA - Entrance exams for Kabul Univ., Islamic Studies Univ., Kabul Medical Inst. & Kabul Polytechnic were given today to over 1,200 Kabul Province high school graduates.

11/18 - NYT - The Bush Adm. said that under a new arms policy adopted in recent weeks, Gulbuddin's faction would no longer receive munitions purchased with American money (see p. 15).

- PT - A UN report by Felix Ermacora expressed "deep concern" over the human rights situation in the ROA. The report states that the Kabul regime holds over 3,000 political prisoners & that opponents of the regime are still being tried by special security courts. "The conditions of prisoners awaiting trial or verdict are deplorable & particular attention should be paid to the juvenile rehabilitation center."

11/18 - The Economist - Mujahideen attacked Jalalabad again. Guerrillas say over 4,000 men are besieging the city. The ROA put the number at 10,000. Guerrilla missile attacks have closed Kabul airport several

times recently; they have also cut some roads between Kabul & the provinces, blockading some cities including Ghazni & Khost.

By moving in on Jalalabad again, they are now showing their impatience with small successes. They want a spectacular win before the winter snows freeze the balance of power until the spring. Winter is the oldest enemy of both lots of Afghans. Snow brings the government some relief from attack by the mujaheddin but makes its garrisons difficult to supply. Because the guerrillas control almost all the countryside (except a belt along the Soviet border) none of the government-held cities has a hinterland large enough to feed it.


This year shortages exist again already. Fresh milk is hard to come by in Kabul, and meat and rice are priced beyond the reach of most people. By one estimate, 60% of Kabul's children are severely malnourished. Kabulis queue for days for scanty rations of fuel. On the black market it costs ten times the official price. Kabul gets power only on alternate nights. Communist party members and civil servants (about 250,000 in all)

get free meals, and coupons that entitle them to subsidised goods. For those outside the coupon system life can be miserable.



11/20 - BNA - ROWPA's (Revolutionary Organization of the Working People of Afghanistan) Central Committee held a plenum yesterday & discussed the importance of implementing nat'l reconciliation, creating a peaceful atmosphere & accelerating the process of political pluralism.

- LAT - The US & Saudi Arabia have agreed to provide \$715m to fund covert CIA aid to the resistance. The aid will be used primarily for military equipment & supplies over the next 3 months & is designed to match the estimated \$250/mo Soviet assistance to the ROA. Congress has approved a \$280m package to last the guerrillas through February.



Hekmatyar on Saturday repeated the rebels' offer of amnesty to Afghan Army troops who surrender peacefully.

He proposed that former government soldiers form a revolutionary council with the mujahideen, then hold nationwide elections for a parliament which would draft a new Afghan constitution.

- Bangkok Post - Gulbuddin Hekmatyar called on the US & the USSR to stop arming their respective sides.

"The superpowers must cease their intervention in Afghanistan, cease the supply of weapons," Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, chief of the fundamentalist Hezb-I-Islami guerrilla group, told a news conference.

He said if Moscow stopped supplying the Marxist Kabul government, his men would guarantee a halt in arms supplies to the insurgents from the United States, Pakistan and other foreign countries.

When asked how he could make such an assurance, Hekmatyar said only: "We'll cross that bridge when we come to it."

11/21 - Committee for a Free Afghanistan News Release - Since 2/15/88, over 3,800 supply flights from the USSR have landed at Kabul airport; the flow of sophisticated weapons has taken priority over badly needed food-stuffs; the Peshawar-based resistance has been receiving \$50m/month from the US.

- NYT - Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan, head of the UN reconstruction & repatriation program

in Afghanistan, told a press conference in New York that UN relief workers now enjoy their best access to Afghanistan in 10 years but they lack the money to start projects which would encourage the return of refugees.

He said donors appeared reluctant to give fearing this would help Najibullah remain in power.



■ Prince Sadruddin

Although donors had pledged \$991.5 million as of Aug. 31 toward last year's United Nations appeal for \$1.3 billion in Afghan aid, most of what they are offering is in the form of food, medical, assistance and supplies, and most of this has not yet been delivered. As a result, Prince Sadruddin said, he has only \$17 million in cash to finance reconstruction inside the country, with 60 percent of this donated by Japan.

The United States channels roughly \$100 million a year of humanitarian aid through the guerrilla groups in the hope of strengthening their position in the country, while providing only token assistance to Prince Sadruddin's agency.


- BNA - Najibullah issued a decree for the establishment of a "commission besides the Supreme Council for the Defense of the ROA." The 11-member commission will launch a campaign against crime, sabotage, hoarding, etc., as well as oversee the distribution of fuel, food & other essential goods to coupon holders. Mir Sahib Karwal chairs the group which will also "apply on the speculators & the defaulters."

- The state of emergency was extended for another 6 months.

11/22 - BNA - The Peasant's Justice Party of Afghanistan (PJPA) celebrated its 2nd anniversary yesterday.

11/23 - SCMP - The mujahideen released 2 Soviet POWs last week & plan to release 2 more shortly. [The PT reported that the prisoners were released on 11/27.]

11/23 - PT - Gailani, AIG Chief Justice & head of the central election commission, announced that elections for a 500-member transitional shura would be held by next April in liberated areas of Afghanistan, refugee camps & among refugees in other countries. Shura members would be elected proportionately by refugees & mujahideen prior to the termination of the tenure of the present AIG.



Pir Gailani

- HK Standard - Soviet military aid to the ROA is estimated by East European diplomats to be ca. \$3b/year. The same report says US aid to the resistance is \$500m/year.

In late October, the Daily Payam, official organ of the ruling People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, published an unusually detailed account of Soviet aid.

From February to August, it said, 266,543 tonnes of Soviet goods crossed through the border town of Hayratan.

Among the goods, more than 40,000 tonnes of fuel, 82,000 tonnes of wheat, 1,000 tonnes of cooking oil, 900 tonnes of sugar, and 540 tonnes of flour rolled into Afghanistan on more than 21,000 Soviet trucks, the newspaper said.

The United Nations says another 220,000 tonnes of Soviet-supplied flour, some of it purchased from the United States and Australia, is in the pipeline.

Also since February, 168,750 tonnes of goods have arrived in Kabul aboard 6,750 Soviet transport planes, diplomats say.

Diplomats estimated that until recently the airlift contained 75 percent weapons and 25 percent food.

But Afghan officials reportedly have asked that the food portion be raised to 40 percent in view of the coming winter and the country's transportation problems.

To help with this problem, the Soviets recently gave Kabul 2,200 heavy duty trucks, the state-run Bakhtar news agency reported in late October.

Tens of thousands of vehicles were left behind by the Red Army when it pulled out.

Diplomats say the duration and size of the operation make it one of the biggest aid programmes in Soviet history.

"The costs are tremendous and we believe that not even Moscow knows how much it is paying," said one high-ranking Asian diplomat whose country is friendly with both Moscow and Kabul.

If we didn't have food from the Soviet Union, we would starve. We have no one else to turn to. - Massuma Esmaty Wardak, president of the Afghanistan Women's Council

11/24 - PT - Najibullah told visiting Pakistani journalists that he was willing to negotiate with Pakistan on the recognition of the Durand Line, as well as on other old & new issues.

- Washington Post - David Ottaway writes that US policy toward the Afghan conflict "appears to be something of a muddle" over whether to seek a political or a military solution in the country. Robert Peck, a retired State Dept. official who dealt with Afghanistan from 1984-88, says the US is still following a 1988 policy that didn't work very well in 1989. Peck favors an intra-Afghan dialogue. Selig Harrison says that the US & Pakistan no longer consider a military victory likely but that the US goal is "to increase military pressure on the Kabul regime enough to force a coup against Najibullah, or at a minimum to strengthen the AIG position in any future negotiations." Harrison finds the US "unenthusiastic about the UN initiative" since its broad base would not include the AIG as such. Some Congressmen are lobbying to get the Pentagon more involved in what has become a conventional-style rather than a guerrilla war. (See p.24)

The flow of regular arms has reportedly been restored, and the administration and Congress have just agreed on an initial appropriations of \$280 million in covert military aid for fiscal 1990.

But key military items such as Lightfoot mine-clearing equipment, Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, heavy 120mm Spanish mortars and special explosives to crater airport runways and destroy Afghan aircraft on the ground remain in short supply. . . .

Particularly disturbing to U.S. Afghan specialists are persistent reports that the Pakistani ISI is still acting to ensure that anti-Western, Islamic fundamentalist Gulbuddin Hekmatyar gets a steady supply of American arms over U.S. objections. Gulbuddin has resigned as AIG foreign minister, and his commanders have been involved in bloody clashes with other AIG factions.

Despite attempts by Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto to gain control of her country's Afghan policy, ISI still controls the U.S. arms-supply pipeline and dictates which Afghan guerrilla commander and faction gets how much, according to commanders, U.S. officials and Afghan experts.



Abdul Wakil

11/26 - NYT - In an article discussing why Afghanistan is not like Eastern Europe & why the Soviets continue to support Najibullah, John Burns quotes ROA Foreign Minister Abdul Wakil:

"Najibullah is not Erich Honecher, Najibullah is like Gorbachev! And that is why Gorbachev supports Najibullah."

11/28 - NYT - Sukhoi, the Soviet state enterprise which

made the SU-25s used in the Afghan war, has teamed up with Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. to produce a supersonic jet for business executives. The Soviets say they can have a prototype ready in 3 years & start production in 5.

11/29 - NYT - The Soviet legislature granted unconditional amnesty to all former servicemen who committed crimes while serving in Afghanistan, including over 2,000 prisoners serving time for crimes ranging from petty theft to murder. The amnesty will take effect on 12/15 & will include POWs & deserters. The USSR lists 330 men missing in action (including an unknown number of deserters) & 75-100 POWs in Pakistan [some of whom who don't want to go home]. (*)

- The ROA asked the US to stop supplying the guerrillas with Egyptian-made rockets. They say that over 38 people were killed & 100 wounded in attacks over the weekend. Since 2/15/88, over 2,000 rockets have been fired on Kabul causing about 1,000 deaths of which at least 90% were civilians.

- Washington Post - Barnett Rubin writes that more Soviet-supplied Scud missiles have been fired by the ROA in Afghanistan than in the entire Iran-Iraq war. He suggests the following steps for a solution in Afghanistan:

Of course, Najibullah will have to go, but there are many steps between the beginning and the end of a political process. The resistance will not recognize the current government or ruling party as a negotiating partner, but there are several plans being circulated by prominent Afghans as well as the U.N. for including "good Moslems" from Kabul in a distinct minority position during some transitional arrangement.

Such a settlement will only be possible with the participation of the United Nations. Not only the superpowers, but also Saudi Arabia, Iran and Pakistan—all deeply involved in supporting their own Afghan factions—will have to agree to a settlement. The recent support for a cutoff of aid by the superpowers made by

the radical Afghan resistance leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who receives ample aid from Saudi and other Arab sources, only emphasizes this. The U.N. Secretary General's office is preparing a new initiative, which has two parts: to establish an "international consensus" among all relevant international powers in favor of a political settlement and to bring together all Afghan political forces in opposition to Kabul, mainly resistance field commanders, in order to produce a representative delegation capable of taking political action.

Nothing would help this effort more than a joint declaration by Bush and Gorbachev that they prefer the success of this initiative to the pursuit of an increasingly meaningless competition.

12/1 - BNA - An AIDs special laboratory was set up last year in Kabul's central blood bank. Of 4,800 blood samples tested, only 2 were positive & further tests in Kenya showed them to be negative also.

- AfghaNews - Moh'd Ali Rahmani was appointed Gov. of Kunar Prov. replacing Maulawi Ghulam Rabbani who became an advisor to the AIG ministry of reconstruction.

- An ROA deputy minister of education, Abdul Hamid Mubariz, was given political asylum in early November by the French Gov't.

12/2 - BNA - Kabul Mayor Abdul Karim Misaq returned yesterday from a visit to Moscow where he discussed canalization projects. And "the Mayor of Moscow City said that banking accounts will be opened in the banks of Moscow City for the voluntary assistance of Moscow citizens to Kabul inhabitants."

12/3 - BNA reports that the daily Hewad front-paged news of Shevardnadze's talk with Zahir Shah [which took place before the Bush Gorbachev mini-summit]. They discussed possible political solutions of the Afghan problem. "Shevardnadze considered his talk with the former Afghan king as interesting." (See p.15 for an article on the summit)
- PT - Benazir Bhutto asked Bush to discuss the Afghan problem at the summit.

12/5 - NYT - ROA Brig. Gen'l Ghulam Haider was killed last week in the fighting at Jalalabad.

- BNA - Currently "60% of the total products of the factories, 75% industrial products of the state sector & 60% of the revenue of the state budget come from the USSR," according to the daily Payam. ROA trade with the USSR is 60% of the total now & will increase by 30% during the current year.
- Bakhtar quotes VOA as reporting that US Ambassador Robert Oakley ordered Mujaddidi to prevent other "ringleaders" from engaging in drug trafficking.

12/6 - NYT - John Burns reports that some Kabul officials say that the area could be faced with famine this winter. Fuel is in short supply & the ROA has shut down 2 generating plants at night, plunging much of the city into darkness.

The only food reaching the city comes from the local area or is trucked in from the north. 15 lbs. of wheat already costs \$3.22 in the bazaar.

- BNA - The ROA has set up a number of security posts along the Salang Highway to keep supply routes open.

- PT - Australia will provide 20,000 tons of wheat to the World Food Program for Afghan refugees in Pakistan. The estimated value is \$5¹/₂m & will bring Australian aid to Afghan refugees in Pakistan to about \$51m since 1980.

12/7 - BNA - Amir Moh'd, a.k.a. Mullah Malang, a Khalis commander, was injured when unidentified persons fired on his car in Quetta.


12/9 - BNA - In the ROA the agricultural sector employs almost 80% of the population & agricultural production constitutes over 50% of domestic & export earnings. A new agricultural policy is in the works: "In order to achieve the goal of higher agricultural growth by the year 2000," Afs. 44.5b will be appropriated for projects - Afs. 10.3b for seeds, credit, etc., & Afs. 34.2b for irrigation.

- The Supreme Command of the ROA armed forces yesterday decreed that garrison commanders are required to prevent actions contrary to the law; "armed movement & movement without having service cards of members of the tribal & regional forces inside the cities are strictly forbidden;" forces entering cities must check their arms at entry posts & get a receipt. House searches must be made with court permission & in the presence of delegations of the Kabul garrison, Sarandoy police & state security representatives.

12/11 - BNA - Gen. Moh'd Nabi Azimi, 1st deputy defense minister, was named gen'l commander of the Kabul garrison as well.

- Hairatan City now has a population of over 5,000, mostly state employees.

- A 13-day UNESCO seminar on teaching English as a foreign language ended last week in Kabul. Future seminars will be held in the provinces.



AFGHANISTAN FORUM



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ABBREVIATIONS USED

AICMB	- Afghan Information Centre <u>Monthly Bulletin</u>
AIG	- Afghan Interim Government
BNA	- Bakhtar News Agency
CC	- Central Committee
CSM	- Christian Science Monitor
DYOA	- Democratic Youth Organization of Afghanistan
FRG	- Federal Republic of Germany
GDR	- German Democratic Republic
ICRC	- Int'l Committee of the Red Cross
KT	- Kabul Times
LAT	- Los Angeles Times
NGO	- Non Governmental Organization
NWFP	- Northwest Frontier Province
NYT	- New York Times
OIC	- Organization of Islamic Conference
PDPA	- People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan
PSFO	- Peace, Solidarity & Friendship Organization
PT	- Pakistan Times
PVO	- Private Voluntary Organization
RC	- Revolutionary Council
RTV	- Refugee Tent Village
SCMP	- South China Morning Post
UNGA	- United Nations General Assembly
UNCOMAP-	United Nations Good Offices Mission to Afghanistan & Pakistan
UNHCR	- United Nations High Commission for Refugees
WSJ	- Wall Street Journal

Line drawings from the 1982 Afghanistan Calendar of the Chicago Afghanistan Relief Committee.

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